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Static code analysis is the analysis of program code without executing it. Static
analysis tools are therefore a useful part of automated software analysis. Typical
uses for these tools are to detect software defects and otherwise suspect code.
Several algorithms and formal methods are available specializing in code analysis.
Token pattern matching is used by simpler tools, while more in-depth tools prefer
formal methods such as abstract interpretation and model checking. The choice
of algorithms thus depends on the preferred analysis precision and soundness.
We introduced the practical problems facing static analysis, especially in the con-
text of C++ software. For static analysis to work in a satisfiable way, the tool must
understand the semantics of the code being analyzed. Many tools, particularly
open-source ones, have deficiencies in their capabilities of code understanding due
to being unable to correctly parse complex C++. Furthermore, we examined the
difficulty of handling large numbers of warnings issued by these tools in mature
software projects. As a summary, we presented a list of five open-source and six
commercial static analysis tools that are able to analyze C++ source code.
To find out the viability of integrating static analysis tools in real-world projects,
we performed a two-part evaluation. The first part was a measurement of the
detection accuracy of four open-source and two commercial tools in 30 synthetic
test cases. We discovered that Clang excels in this test, although each tool found
different sets of defects, thus reaffirming the idea that multiple tools should be
used together. In the second part of the evaluation, we applied these tools on six
consecutive point releases of DynaRoad. While none of the tools were able to
detect any of the crash defects known in these releases, they proved to be valuable
in finding other unknown problems in our code base. Finally, we detailed the
integration effort of three static analysis tools into our existing build process.
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Staattisella koodianalyysilla tarkoitetaan ohjelmakoodin analysointia suorittamat-
ta sitä. Tämä tekee siitä hyödyllistä ohjelmien automaattista analyysia varten.
Tyypillisiä käyttökohteita ovat ohjelmavirheiden havaitseminen sekä tyylitarkas-
tuksien tekeminen. Analyysityökalujen toteuttamiseen on useita algoritmeja sekä
formaaleja menetelmiä. Yksinkertaisemmat työkalut turvautuvat merkeistä koos-
tuvien hahmojen etsimiseen lähdekoodista. Toteutustavan valinta riippuu pitkälti
halutusta analyysin tarkkuudesta.
Työssä esiteltiin C++-ohjelmien analyysiin kohdistuvia ongelmia. Staattisen ana-
lyysityökalun on toimiakseen ymmärrettävä analysoitava koodi riittävän hyvin,
jotta analyysin tuloksista olisi hyötyä. Monella analyysityökalulla on vaikeuksia
ymmärtää monimutkaista lähdekoodia, mikä koskee erityisesti avoimen lähdekoo-
din ohjelmia. Työssä käsiteltiin lisäksi syitä miksi laajojen ohjelmien analysointi
on hankalaa suurten varoitusmäärien takia. Lopuksi listattiin viisi avoimen lähde-
koodin analysointiohjelmaa sekä kuusi kaupallista ohjelmaa.
Työn tarkoituksena oli selvittää mahdollisuuksia integroida staattisia analyysioh-
jelmia olemassa oleviin kehitysprosesseihin suorittamalla ohjelmilla kaksiosainen
arviointi. Ensimmäinen arviointi koostui 30:stä synteettisestä testistä, joissa mitat-
tiin analyysityökalujen tarkkuutta havaita ennalta määriteltyjä ohjelmavirheitä.
Clang-kääntäjä suoriutui parhaiten näistä testeistä. Kaikki analyysityökalut
havaitsivat kuitenkin eri virheitä, mikä vahvistaa käsitystä siitä, että mahdolli-
simman monen työkalun käyttö on suositeltavaa. Toisessa arvioinnissa tutkittiin
valituilla analyysityökaluilla kuutta eri DynaRoadin julkaisuversiota. Saaduilla
tuloksilla pystyttiin vertailemaan analyysityökalujen pätevyyttä havaita ohjel-
masta raportoituja kaatumisvikoja. Analyysityökalut eivät tunnistaneet yhtään
tunnettua vikaa, mutta osoittivat hyödyllisyytensä löytämällä muita tuntematto-
mia vikoja. Työn lopuksi käytiin läpi kolmen analyysityökalun integrointi olemassa
oleviin kehitysprosesseihin.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Static analysis is the analysis of program code without its execution. Programs
known as static analysis tools perform the analysis on existing source code.
These tools provide developers with useful information about the presence
of possible defects and vulnerabilities in source code. Fixing these issues
typically increases the quality of the software [21, 34, 61].
Developing software with zero bugs is a respectable albeit unrealistic goal.
Using static analysis tools in the software engineering process can help reduce
the number of software defects. Unfortunately, tools often report a large
number of superfluous warnings known as false positives that hinder tool
adoption. Applying these tools on existing large code bases can escalate the
number of false positives even further. Reducing the effect of these unwanted
reports is a large part of getting useful information out of these tools. [5, 6,
37, 61]
As most static analysis tools are able to find different sets of issues, we
will evaluate and use as many tools as possible. Using multiple tools results in
large reports with many warnings both true and false positives. To circumvent
the large number of reports and still get useful information out of these tools,
we will integrate each tool in our automated build process. This will enable us
to get defect information for each build automatically, and more importantly,
only be alerted when new defects are introduced.
1.1 Background
Static analysis tools come in many forms that fulfill different purposes. Some
tools are specialized in finding security vulnerabilities while others analyze
code for stylistic issues. Many different things can be tracked and analyzed
by these tools. In modern compilers, types and sometimes even values are
8
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followed and checked against predetermined constraints and requirements.
This allows compilers to perform aggressive optimizations by tracking things
such as compile-time constant values and unreachable code [45]. Advanced
static analysis tools strive to make even more thorough analyses than compilers.
As some forms of analysis can take a considerable amount of time depending
on the size of the code base, it is useful to separate it from compilation.
Looking inside these tools, we see that they can have vastly different
implementations. Algorithms for statically analyzing code include formal
methods, such as abstract interpretation [19] and model checking [28, 58, 68].
Other implementations use more straightforward methods like bug pattern
matching [18] and value tracking [30].
Many static analysis tools exist today, but not all are suitable for analyzing
large-scale production software, especially software programmed in C++. The
C++ programming language presents many difficulties for these analyzers
due to being a multi-paradigm general-purpose programming language that
maintains backwards compatibility with the low-level C language. Creating
a fully standards compliant parser is therefore not an easy task. Libraries
providing a functional parser do exist, but their standards compliance is not
always sufficient. Fortunately, new frameworks are being built making it easier
to implement static analyzers. One recent example is the LLVM1 compiler
framework and its Clang2 compiler. New analyzers such as Parfait [17]
and LLBMC [26, 48, 58] have sprung up that use these existing frameworks
and can therefore focus on the analysis instead of code parsing.
DynaRoad3 is a Windows desktop software for road construction schedul-
ing [39]. The software itself is implemented with the C++ programming lan-
guage and the user interface uses the Microsoft Foundation Classes4 (MFC)
UI framework. MFC is a vendor-dependent library that requires the use of
language extensions developed by Microsoft. The analysis of DynaRoad
source code is thus not as straightforward as it would be for purely standards
compliant code [9].
1.2 Thesis Motivation
Software is seldom bug-free, which makes it essential to discover ways of
finding bugs as soon as possible. Static analyzers provide one of the many
components to fulfill this task. Performing static analysis on the source
1http://llvm.org/
2http://clang.llvm.org/
3http://www.dynaroad.com/
4http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/d06h2x6e(v=vs.120).aspx
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code of software can help in pointing out possible defects and vulnerabilities.
Dynamic analysis, such as unit testing, is also useful as the two forms of
analysis complement each other by finding different types of problems at
different points in the software engineering process. [16]
In addition to the problems faced when analyzing existing large-scale code
bases with non-standard language extensions, the tools are in most parts
unsound and therefore report a large number of false positives. False positives
are warnings and defects that are incorrect due to the analyzer not being fully
context-sensitive and path-sensitive. These imperfections are the result of
tools using mere approximations for their program model due to the analysis
problem being undecidable [15, 43]. No tool is therefore perfect, which is why
it is recommended to use as many tools as possible [59, 66].
Excluding style checking, the DynaRoad development process currently
lacks any meaningful form of static analysis. Thus, introducing several new
tools to this process increases the number of warnings considerably. Systems
have to be put in place to manage the analysis reports to prevent overwhelming
the developers with low-impact warnings. At Google, a systematic effort to
track and review defects was introduced, which provided developers with
feedback on new defects found at each point in the development process [5].
Giving developers feedback and making defect reports manageable in the
DynaRoad development process is therefore a valuable objective.
1.3 Thesis Goals
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate existing C++ static analysis tools and
to research the feasibility of performing analysis on the DynaRoad code
base. It is therefore our objective to find as many tools to evaluate as possible
that can handle code that has evolved for over 10 years. Open-source and
free tools have no immediate cost associated to them and are thus easier to
evaluate and integrate. Commercial tools are often very expensive and have
time-limited or otherwise restricted evaluations.
Additionally, we want to find out how each tool can be integrated into
our existing automatic build process. These tools being a part of that process
means that developers receive immediate feedback when new defects are
introduced into the code. It is important for developers to react to these
defect reports, but forcing the build to fail in case of the presence of any
low-impact report is unrealistic. As these tools can report hundreds, if not
thousands, of defects for a large software code base, fixing all those issues
slows down the adoption of these tools. We will thus evaluate the feasibility
of reporting only the differences between defect reports. This makes it easier
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for developers to focus on new defects that they are able to fix more easily
due to having recent knowledge of the relevant code.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis begins by introducing the concept of static analysis and its
capabilities in Chapter 2. The introduction continues by detailing the various
practical issues and use cases of static analysis tools.
Chapter 3 follows the introductory chapter with a more detailed explana-
tion of the various technicalities involved in the static analysis process. The
similarities with modern compilers is examined in addition to the various
levels on which static analyzers can function. A more detailed follow-up
on the different levels comes thereafter by introducing the specifics of some
analysis algorithms and their capabilities. The extension facilities and support
for in-code annotation languages of some tools are also investigated. Finally,
the technical hurdles facing these tools when analyzing larger-scale software
in production are considered.
The C++ language is briefly introduced in Chapter 4 along with various
vendor-specific language extensions. Problems arising when analyzing complex
programming languages and some possible solutions are introduced thereafter.
The chapter continues by explaining the importance of defect classification
and giving an example of an existing classification. Ending with a final
listing of various existing C++-specific static analysis tools, the chapter gives
a comprehensive overview of the capabilities of each tool.
The thesis continues in Chapter 5 by giving a short summary of the features
and technical details of the DynaRoad software. Existing practices in the
build process and used static analysis tools are also explained. Furthermore,
the potential improvements to the software engineering process are discussed
in the final part of the chapter.
In Chapter 6, a handful of tools are evaluated in two different ways.
A small set of test cases are devised and the capabilities of each tool is
then determined. To evaluate the tools on larger software, they are run
on a predetermined set of consecutive release versions of DynaRoad. The
differences between these runs are then compared to known bugs and defects,
thus giving us a performance metric on the effectiveness of each tool. The
results of these evaluations are given in addition to the effort required to
integrate these tools into the existing build process.
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the results obtained in the previous chapters
and how these should be interpreted. Future improvements to the process
are also investigated and considered.
Chapter 2
Introduction to Static Analysis
The goal of this chapter is to give a broad overview of what static analysis is
and how it helps us improve software quality. We will begin by explaining why
static analysis is used, and what types of problems it can detect. Furthermore,
this chapter will also detail the practical issues facing static analysis and how
they can be solved.
Static analysis is the analysis of the software source code, bytecode, or
occasionally even binary executables. This is the opposite to unit testing and
other dynamic analysis methods, where the analysis focuses on the runtime
execution of software. These methods sometimes even complement each other
as shown by Aggarwal and Jalote [1], where both forms of analysis are used
together to improve the precision of detecting buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
One useful analogy for explaining static analysis is that it can be thought
of as source code spell checking [16]. Static analysis tools have existed since
the 1970s in the form of “lint” tools. One such notable tool is the lint program
by Johnson [38] for checking C source code, where it augments the C compiler
by enforcing stricter type rules than the compiler.
Even though static analysis can never completely prove that a program
is bug-free, it can still provide us with useful information regarding security,
regressions, and performance. It is therefore often used for finding bugs and
security vulnerabilities in software. Other practical uses include style checking
[6], dead code detection [27], and the enforcement of coding conventions.
2.1 Benefits of Static Analysis
Programmers are not perfect and they will eventually make mistakes. These
mistakes are typically the result of small typing errors and the lack of un-
derstanding certain programming principles. One way of addressing these
12
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problems is by doing code review, but that typically requires manual review
by other programmers. Additionally, a programmer might be biased and
consider some parts of the program more important thus mistakenly letting
other defective parts trough the review. A static analysis tool treats all
parts of the source code equally and will thus always analyze every part of
it. Due to this unbiased and deterministic nature of static analysis, it gives
programmers an efficient measure against these types of errors. Another
typical problem with manual review is the size of the program. Programmers
reviewing hundreds of thousands, even millions of lines of code is practically
unfeasible, but for a static analysis such code sizes poses no problems. Whole
program analysis for any large program is an undeniable benefit, and static
analysis tools make this practical. [15]
As static analysis is performed at compilation time, it provides a great
opportunity for software engineers to integrate static analysis tools early
in the build process. The earlier an issue is detected, the easier and more
cost efficient it is to fix. Early detection also means that the programmers
receive immediate feedback on the code they are writing. This in turn
enables the programmers to iterate on their code faster and possibly notice
similar problems in other parts of the code. Thus, programmers making these
mistakes learn to handle them in the future. [16]
The use of static analysis tools has been shown to provide cost reductions
when maintaining mature software products. On average, maintenance cost
reductions of 17% were observed in a benchmark by Baca, Carlsson, and
Lundberg [7]. These tools provide an efficient way of improving software
quality as detecting even one severe defect is enough to make a tool cost-
effective [61].
2.2 Practical Issues
Rice’s theorem states that any nontrivial analysis applied to a program can
be reduced to the halting problem, thus rendering all static analysis problems
undecidable in the worst case. This means that all static analysis tools are
imperfect and have to settle on using approximations and making assumptions
about the code they are analyzing. Using approximations in static analysis
tools does not make them completely useless, though, as we can still gain
useful and relevant information from the results they provide. Typically, the
issues pertaining to static analysis are more practical in nature. [15, 43]
As the tools themselves work based on approximate representations of the
analyzed code, some of the issues facing them are related to this approximate
nature of the whole process. The results of an analysis tool can be categorized
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into four classes as shown in Table 2.1. A true positive is an actual defect
correctly detected by the analysis. A false positive is a defect found by the
analysis that is not an actual defect. A false negative is an actual defect not
found by the analysis. A true negative is correct code found correct by the
analysis, i.e., everything not included in the previous categories.
Table 2.1: Result classification.
Reported Not reported
Defect True positive False negative
Non-defect False positive True negative
A static analysis tool that finds all possible issues is said to be sound.
In practice, soundness also means that the tool reports a high number of
false positives. This is no doubt an undesirable trait, which is why most
static analysis tools do not strive for soundness, but rather a balance between
soundness and usability. [59, 66]
When analyzing source code in specific programming languages, soundness
is often further defined respective to something. In the case of C and C++, their
support for arbitrary pointer arithmetic makes sound analysis challenging.
This problem can be circumvented by making assumptions about the memory
model of programs. The Slam static analysis toolkit by Ball and Rajamani
[8] creates sound boolean abstractions of C programs by making simplifying
assumptions about their memory model. This model is described as a “logical
memory model” where related pointers, such as *p and *(p+1), are assumed
to point to the same object.
In addition to soundness, the term complete is used to define an analyzer
that never produces false positives. On the other hand, the analyzer may
erroneously leave some actual problems unreported. This means that the
analyzer produces false negatives. [59]
The static analysis process is furthermore defined with the help of certain
properties. These properties of interest are flow-sensitivity, path-sensitivity,
and context-sensitivity. Flow-sensitivity describes the sensitivity of an analysis
to remember the order of instructions. In case the order is not remembered,
the analysis is said to be flow-insensitive. Path-sensitivity on the other hand
concerns itself with the ability of an analysis to remember the path taken
through program branches. If the analysis considers all paths possible without
avoiding impossible paths, it is said to be path-insensitive. Lastly, the most
involved property, context-sensitivity, describes the ability of an analysis to
consider its context, e.g., remembering call graphs in interprocedural analysis.
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An analysis is context-insensitive if it fails to understand the side-effects of
the interprocedural analysis, i.e., the analysis is merely intraprocedural. [59]
Another important facet for a static analyzer is to understand the semantics
of the code being analyzed. This means that the static analyzer has to have
similar functionality to a compiler. For complex programming languages this
can be difficult to implement due to the number of different and slightly
incompatible compilers that use their own language dialects.
2.3 Uses of Static Analysis
Static analysis tools come in many different forms. Some tools can auto-
matically validate coding conventions and check for style issues. Other tools
specialize in finding serious security problems and other non-stylistic issues in
software. Many static analysis tools combine style checking and bug finding
thus supporting several forms of analysis. In the following sections we explore
the various ways static analysis tools can improve the quality of software.
2.3.1 Type Checking
Most modern compilers of type-safe programming languages perform type
checking. Type checking makes it easy to prevent programming errors such as
the assignment of incompatible types, as show in Listing 2.1, and the passing
of invalid arguments to functions.
Listing 2.1: Example of an assignment with incompatible types.
1 float x = 1.0;
2 int∗ y = x;
Some programming languages support implicit conversions between types
which may be undesirable. Listing 2.2 shows that in C++ one can convert
from a floating point value to an integer implicitly. These types of conversions
are called type coercions. In this particular case the floating point value is
truncated before being converted to an integer.
Listing 2.2: Example of type coercion.
1 float x = 1.0;
2 int y = x;
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Both cases are relevant, but only the first one is an actual type violation.
A programmer could consider the second case as a false positive if it were
reported as an issue by at static analysis tool, because there is no loss of
data. For other values of x data loss could occur, which again would make
the example case a true positive.
To improve the type checking done by the compiler, some static analysis
tools are able to read annotations written in the source code. Often by
adding these annotations, the complexity of the analysis is dramatically
decreased, thus making even hard problems feasible [66]. The use of such
annotations augment the existing compiler type system by giving programmers
the necessary tools to tell the analyzer about specific type and value semantics.
Shankar et al. [57] experimented with giving variables a taintedness property
in order to enforce security-related data-flow policies.
2.3.2 Style Checking
Style checking tools are a simple form of static analysis tools analyzing
source code for the purpose of finding coding style violations. Today, modern
compilers come equipped with various types of built-in style and coding
convention checks. These checks are typically enabled by explicitly enabling
them or by setting a suitably high “warning level.”
In Listing 2.3 the whitespace usage is not consistent, which could be
detected by a static analysis tool as a whitespace violation. Compilers do
not traditionally detect whitespace issues, but implementing such checks in
external tools is often trivial using regular expressions.
Listing 2.3: Example of a whitespace style violation.
1 if (x== 2)
2 return;
Regular expressions are not aware of language semantics and will therefore
typically report false positives as seen in Listing 2.4. In this case the style
convention dictates that there should only be a single statement per line.
The check does not know that the multiple statements are part of a for loop,
and would thus be considered a false positive, because for loops are typically
written on a single line.
Maintaining non-whitespace related coding conventions can be more chal-
lenging. These checks typically require support from the compiler itself due
to their semantic nature. One such useful convention is the unused function
parameter check demonstrated in Listing 2.5.
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Listing 2.4: Example of a whitespace false positive.
1 for (int x = 0; x < 10; ++x)
2 {
3 ...
4 }
Listing 2.5: Example of an unused parameter.
1 int add(int x, int y)
2 {
3 return x + x;
4 }
In addition to simpler style and whitespace checks, we can perform larger-
scale analysis on source code in order to find code smells. Code smells are
non-technical issues related to maintainability and program design. Some
automatic tools have been developed for automatic inspection of such issues,
such as the jCosmo program by Emden and Moonen [22] and the Detex
program by Moha et al. [50].
Another non-technical static analysis application is the detection of dupli-
cate code, also known as clone detection. Duplicate code is often the result
of programmers copy-pasting similar code, which then leads to code defects
when the copy-pasted code is not updated along with the original code. One
way to eliminate duplicate code is by refactoring the offending code, but
this manual process requires finding every instance of the duplicate code in
addition to making error-prone modifications. Li et al. [46] implemented a
static analysis tool, CP-Miner, for automating the discovery of duplicate
code.
Another relatively well-known clone detection tool is PMD, which provides
a “copy-paste detector”1 for the purpose of finding clones. This tool supports
both Java and C/C++ source code and provides results as a HTML report.
Duplicates are found with the Rabin-Karp string matching algorithm, which
makes the task of finding substrings within large code bases feasible.
One recent application of clone detection methods is ClonEvol [32],
which uses the source code documentation generator Doxygen2 together
with the similarity analysis tool Simian3. Doxygen is used as a simple static
1http://pmd.sourceforge.net/pmd-4.2.5/cpd.html
2http://www.doxygen.org/
3http://www.harukizaemon.com/simian/
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analyzer that parses source code and provides semantic meaning to it. This
information is used to track the evolution of code in a version control system
as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Simian is a general-purpose similarity analyzer
that is in this case used to find clones and track their movement and behavior
throughout the code base history.
Figure 2.1: ClonEvol output for the open-source FileZilla application. [32]
2.3.3 Finding Bugs
Contrary to style checking, bug finding tools look for patterns which may lead
to behavior unintended by the programmer. Sometimes style checks, such as
unused variables and parameters, can help in detecting these kinds of issues,
but bug checks are often more specific in nature. The distinction between
style checking and bug finding tools is that the purpose of the latter is to
detect problems in the source code which might lead to runtime issues [34].
Fixing problems reported by style checking tools do not necessarily result in
any runtime differences.
A typical problem in C++ programs is the mistake of assigning to a variable
instead of comparing to a variable. This manifests itself as a completely
valid and syntactically valid program, but is obviously a mistake as seen in
Listing 2.6.
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Listing 2.6: Example of an unintended assignment.
1 if (x = 100)
2 f(x);
Unfortunately, sometimes the assignment is actually intended as in List-
ing 2.7, which makes this problem harder to detect unambiguously. In this
case, though, the distinction is that the assignment is a pointer assignment
and that the pointer dereference is dependent on the result of the assignment.
A simple tool might report both cases as errors, which is obviously wrong for
the second case, and thus lead to a false positive.
Listing 2.7: Example of an intended assignment.
1 if (int∗ x = get_pointer())
2 f(∗x);
FindBugs4 is a popular and widely researched static analysis tool for
Java-based software. FindBugs works by analyzing Java bytecode looking
for specific bug patterns, such as infinite recursions and guaranteed null
pointer exceptions [18]. The tool has since been further improved by adding
in support for more complex data- and control-flow analysis capabilities in
order to more reliably detect null pointer dereferences [36]. The null pointer
analysis uses an approximation of the static single assignment (SSA) form by
trying to detect distinct values among local variables and operands. Forward
data-flow analysis is then performed using the approximate SSA to find all
null pointer dereferences. Finally, a backward data-flow analysis is done for
each possible null pointer dereference to actually verify its existence [35].
2.3.4 Improving Security
Programming errors, such as buffer overflows, are a serious and, unfortunately,
a recurring issue in software. Static analysis tools can find these problems in
a similar fashion to the previously mentioned bug finding tools. In the case
of security issues, though, the number of false negatives should be minimized
and scrutinized through manual code review.
Splint5 is an open-source static analyzer for C programs specializing
itself in detecting security vulnerabilities. The analyzer can detect buffer
4http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
5http://www.splint.org/
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overflows, format string problems, and other programming mistakes often
attributed to reduced software security [25].
In C and C++ programs, format string vulnerabilities represent a real
threat due to the lack of type checking. User input is sometimes used directly
as a format string, deliberately or by mistake, which leads to serious problems.
In Listing 2.8, if the string input by the user is %s, the printf function will
proceed to read characters directly off the program stack. Here though, the
stack could contain sensitive information which would then be compromised.
Attackers can also use format strings to write data with printf using the
%n format specifier, which writes the current count of output characters to a
variable. [57]
Listing 2.8: Example of a format string vulnerability.
1 printf(buf);
When copying strings with unsafe C functions, such as strcpy demon-
strated in Listing 2.9, a static analysis tool can mistakenly report the copy
as a possible buffer overflow. A complete analysis of the possible inputs to
strcpy is required to understand that no buffer overflow is possible. This
case requires the sizes of the source and destination to be statically known at
compile-time, but without this knowledge, a naive analysis would give a false
positive.
Listing 2.9: Example of a non-overflowing copy.
1 const char∗ x = "Hello";
2 char buf[256];
3 strcpy(buf, x);
2.3.5 Program Understanding and Visualization
Source code can also be statically analyzed to gather data- and control-flow
information for visualization graphs. These graphs help programmers under-
stand the multiple ways a program can work at runtime. Many integrated
development environments (IDEs) also contain features implemented using
static analysis techniques. A common feature is source code navigation en-
abling programmers to find all references to a symbol or to go directly to
function definitions in other files.
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Static analysis tools will sometimes output reports in graphical formats
using HTML or a graphical user interface. This gives the tool a way of visu-
alizing reported issues by giving detailed data- and control-flow information.
Clang can output analysis reports in HTML format as shown in Figure 2.2.
2 ← Access out-of-bound array element (buffer overflow)
1 Calling 'f' →
1 char f(int i)
2 {
3 char buf[10];
4 return buf[i];
5 }
6
7 int main()
8 {
9 f(20);
10 }
Figure 2.2: Example of a buffer overflow found by Clang.
Chang, Jo, and Her [13] implemented an exception propagation visu-
alization tool using a set-based control-flow framework. This tool gives
users additional information regarding the types of exceptions a specific Java
method throws and the paths traveled by the exception through a control-flow
graph. With this information users of the tool are able to more specifically
decide what exceptions to catch and where. A sample display of the tool can
be seen in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Example of an exception propagation path. [13]
CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCTION TO STATIC ANALYSIS 22
2.3.6 Program Verification
Program verification is the verification of a program using a preexisting
specification. This type of verification is useful in case of mission-critical
programs where no failure is accepted. If the failure of a program has
great economical and social downsides, then having a complete specification
available can be cost-efficient. Ideally, the program specification would specify
the functionality and operation of a program completely, but in practice a
thorough specification like this is often infeasible. This type of a complete
verification is called equivalence checking, but no tools exist for equivalence
checking large-scale software due to the problem size.
The problem can be made feasible by limiting the specification to a partial
specification. The verification of this partial specification is often called
property checking. Property checking verifies the properties of a program
through temporal safety properties. These properties specify the order in
which a set of instructions are disallowed to be executed. The typical use-
after-free bugs can thus be detected by implementing a property checking
rule disallowing the use of pointers after they have been freed.
Program verification and property checking tools are sound with respect
to the specification, i.e., they will never report false negatives. Although,
such tools will often place restrictions on the types of programs that can be
analyzed. Problematic constructs, such as function pointers and arbitrary
pointer arithmetic is therefore not allowed in order to maintain the promised
soundness. These tools are implemented using model checkers or by logical
inference. [16]
Chapter 3
Technical Aspects of Static
Analysis
In this chapter we will continue the description of static analysis by examining
the more in-depth technical aspects of static analysis tools and methods. To
begin, we will explain how similarly static analyzers and compilers function
at the beginning of the analysis process when they transform source code into
data structures. We will also describe a few of the current state-of-the-art
algorithms used by static analyzers. The chapter will continue by showing
how custom rules and checks are typically implemented and what they can
provide developers in terms of improving analysis precision and efficiency.
3.1 Transforming Source Code for Analysis
Simple static analysis tools work by finding predefined string patterns in
source code. More sophisticated tools do not look for patterns in the source
code itself, but instead analyze its more complex representations. In order
to get to this advanced representation, the code is processed similarly to a
compiler, but with the addition of analysis-specific customizations. As seen
in Figure 3.1, a static analysis tool builds a model, e.g., a syntax tree and
control-flow graph, and then does the actual analysis using its predefined
rules.
Many steps in this process are similar to the way compilers work, but
it should be noted that modern C++ compilers do not have clearly defined
boundaries between lexical analysis, parsing, and semantic analysis. Such
an intertwined arrangement is required in order to support the otherwise
ambiguous constructs of the C++ language and is thus also a requirement
for static analysis tools in order for them to be fully standards compliant.
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Results
Perform
Analysis
if ( fgets ( buf ,
sizeof(buf)
stdin) == buf ) {
strcpy ( othr , buf );
system ( othr );
So rce
Code
Figure 3.1: High-level representation of the inner workings of a security-
focused static analysis tool. [16]
As with compilers, static analyzers begin by performing a lexical analysis on
the source code. The purpose of this lexical analysis is to tokenize the input
stream of characters acquired from reading the source code. Next, the stream
of tokens is parsed by a parser into a parse tree, which in turn is transformed
into an abstract syntax tree (AST). An example AST created by Clang from
Listing 3.1 is depicted in Figure 3.2.
Listing 3.1: Source code used for AST example.
1 int main()
2 {
3 int x = 10;
4
5 if (x == 10)
6 return 0;
7
8 return 1;
9 }
The AST is useful during analysis due to it being a normalized version of
the parse tree without extraneous type constructs whose only purpose is to
make the parsing unambiguous. A normalized AST could, for example, be
constructed using a smaller version of the language, e.g., by converting all
for-loops into while-loops. This in turn is beneficial for analysis as then the
tool only is only required to support one type of loop construct thus making
checks simpler.
The next step in the transformation process is to build a symbol table
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IntegerLiteral
Figure 3.2: Example AST produced by Clang.
with semantic analysis. This is the part where variable names and other
identifiers are placed in a symbol table along with their corresponding types.
With this information, a compiler can check identifier types and warn about
their improper use. Similarly, for static analysis, this information is of great
use when searching for bug patterns. With perfect knowledge of all identifier
types, patterns can be constructed to match only specific types, such as
pointers or integers.
Now, with the help of the AST and the symbol table, the static analysis
tool can proceed to the next step of analyzing the control- and data-flows of
the program. These two analysis methods are essential in finding the possible
paths taken by a program and if those paths cause potential problems. To
give an example, let us consider the function f in Listing 3.2 which takes a
single integer as an argument and uses this integer as an array index on a 10
element array. If this function is then called from another function with the
argument 20, then only by analyzing the data-flow can it be irrefutably shown
that the argument causes an array index out of bound error. The output of
Clang demonstrating this is shown in Listing 3.3. In this case the analysis
is an interprocedural analysis, meaning that the whole program is analyzed
while considering the interactions between all functions. The other form of
analysis, intraprocedural analysis, concerns itself only with the analysis of
paths within a single function.
To make data-flow analysis easier, a specific transformation called static
single assignment (SSA) is used. The transformation interprets every mod-
ification made to a variable as a new variable with a new name, which in
turn makes analyzing data-flow easier due to unambiguity. In literature these
new variables are often named using subscripts. Thus, a simple addition of
variables shown in Listing 3.4 can be represented in SSA form as shown in
Listing 3.5.
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Listing 3.2: Example of a buffer overflow found by interprocedural analysis.
1 char f(int i)
2 {
3 char buf[10];
4 return buf[i];
5 }
6
7 int main()
8 {
9 f(20);
10 }
Listing 3.3: Output from Clang detecting a buffer overflow with the help of
data-flow analysis.
1 $ clang −cc1 −fsyntax−only −analyze −analyzer−checker=alpha.security buffer.cpp
2 buffer.cpp:4:12: warning: Access out−of−bound array element (buffer overflow)
3 return buf[i];
4 ^~~~~~
5 1 warning generated.
In case the program branches and each branch assigns a variable different
values, the now differently named variables will finally merge after the branches
join. This merging provides a way for SSA to work in unambiguously even for
branching paths. What essentially happens, is that a new variable is created
using a φ function to that receives the value of any of the branched values.
The use of this function is demonstrated in Listing 3.6.
3.2 Levels of Analysis
Static analysis algorithms can be grouped into roughly three different cate-
gories: lexical, syntactic, and semantic. Some examples of the various types
Listing 3.4: Variable addition.
1 x = 1;
2 y = 2;
3 x = x + y;
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Listing 3.5: Variable addition in SSA form.
1 x1 = 1;
2 y1 = 2;
3 x2 = x1 + y1;
Listing 3.6: φ function joining two branches.
1 if (y > 0)
2 x1 = 1;
3 else
4 x2 = 2;
5 y1 = φ(x1, x2);
of defects belonging to these categories are shown in Table 3.1.
Lexical tools include simple pattern matching analyzers, such as grep.
Pattern matching tools directly analyze the character stream for any unwanted
patterns. More flexibility is achieved by using matching constructs such as
regular expressions.
Syntactic tools, such as Cppcheck and Flint, work with the token
stream. These tools can use the token stream directly or build abstract syntax
trees (AST) out of them. If an AST is built, it can be traversed by the tool
while performing specific checks on the tree nodes. The checker can also
access other nodes reachable from the node being analyzed so gain additional
knowledge of the context.
Semantic tools build upon the syntactic tools by gaining even more
understanding of the analyzed code. Analysis is so in-depth that the tool has
full understanding of the context and interprocedural flow. This is especially
evident in compilers, such as Clang, but also observed in more advanced
static analysis tools, like Cppcheck with its data-flow tracking. Some
analyzers may even have in-depth knowledge of the language being analyzed,
and thus take into account such language features when tracking variable
values. One example of this is the C++ operator new, which can never return
a null pointer due to it always throwing an exception in case of memory
allocation failures. An analysis tool can then use this information and gain
the knowledge that a newly allocated pointer can never be null nor is it ever
aliased.
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Table 3.1: The classifications of various defects into analysis levels.
Defect class Lexical Syntactic Semantic
Use of dangerous function X
Result of assignment as condition X
Non-virtual destructor in virtual class X
Non-explicit single-argument constructor X
Context-sensitive memory leak X
Null pointer dereference X
3.3 Source Code and Bytecode
Static analysis tools can be designed to analyze source code, intermediate
bytecode, and even binaries. Typically, in C and C++ software, the analysis
is focused on the source code as analyzing machine-specific instructions loses
valuable semantic information. In programming languages providing their
own form of intermediate bytecode, such as Java, an analyzer can utilize this
data directly and thus rely completely on the Java compiler itself to parse
the source code correctly. This makes it easier for tool implementors to build
these tools and focus on the more important task of code analysis.
Unfortunately, relying on parsing the source code of C++ programs can
cause parsing problems due to imperfect standards compliance. To cir-
cumvent this obstacle, Merz, Falke, and Sinz [48] implemented a low-level
bounded model checker (LLBMC1) extending the LLVM compiler framework.
LLBMC uses the intermediate bytecode representation output by the LLVM
compiler to create an even more simplified intermediate form that is after
various transformations passed on to a model solver.
3.4 Analysis Methods
Static analysis tools are often built by separating the detection engines from
the actual rules and patterns which define the problem cases we are looking for.
The detection engines can be built using various techniques, such as simple
pattern matching or more complex data-flow and model checking methods.
Tools can also contain multiple detection techniques, which is the case, for
example, in FindBugs, where pattern detectors can be implemented with
and without control- and data-flow sensitivity [34]. In the following sections
we will describe several of the techniques used in these tools.
1http://llbmc.org/
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3.4.1 Pattern Matching
Pattern matching is the simplest form of static analysis. Basically, the idea
is to look for predefined patterns within a character or token stream. The
grep command line utility, found in many Unix-like operating systems, can
be considered as a very simple pattern matcher. With this utility, we can
create regular expressions in order to find unwanted patterns within source
code.
We can, for example, search for the pattern “gets,” which lets us know
of possible uses of the unsafe standard C function gets. The problem with
this, though, is that any string containing the substring “gets” would be
reported as a positive match. Let us consider the case in Listing 3.7 where
even if the search is refined to only match against full words, strings within
comments would still be reported. Fundamentally, the issue here is that the
“gets” pattern only considers the character stream and so lacks any detailed
information about semantics or context from where it was found [15, 16, 59].
The Cpplint2 tool is basically a character stream pattern matcher, which
uses regular expressions to discover possible source code defects.
Listing 3.7: Example case where simple pattern matching can mistakenly
report use of the unsafe gets function.
1 // don’t use gets here
2 char buf[10];
3 fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);
To get around the problem of context-insensitivity, an improvement upon
this method is possible. Instead of matching against a character stream, we
match against the token stream given by lexical analysis. This is how many
tools, such as ITS4 [62] and Cppcheck3, work for cases involving solely
pattern matching. FindBugs [34] uses a similar method to scan for patterns
within the bytecode stream.
3.4.2 Data-flow Analysis
Data-flow analysis methods have been thoroughly researched in the context
of compilers and compiler implementations [2]. The same methods can be
applied to static analysis tools. Some examples of tools implementing data-
flow analysis techniques are FindBugs [34] and Cppcheck.
2http://google-styleguide.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/cpplint/cpplint.py
3http://cppcheck.sourceforge.net/
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The data-flow analysis problem is typically solved with an iterative graph
algorithm [41]. In compilers, this method is often used to find dead code
and to perform various types of optimizations, such as constant propagation.
Constant propagation is an optimization method where expressions that have
the same value everywhere are replaced with the same constant value [2].
Data-flow analysis is a general method where a set of data-flow values are
associated with each program execution point. Specifically, the values in this
set are abstracted depending on the analysis. This makes the analysis more
efficient as we only need to keep track of data relevant to it.
The way data-flow analysis knows what values variables and function
parameters can contain is called value range propagation [53]. Value range
propagation helps the analyzer in tracking the range of values going through
functions. Another related value tracking functionality is taint propagation.
It detects what values can be received from the user and are thus potential
security problems, e.g., printf format strings read from user input.
One typical example of a data-flow analysis is the analysis of reaching
definitions. For this purpose, we define the data-flow values to be the latest
assignments to every variable seen from a specific program execution point.
This allows us to know what each variable contains at that particular point
in the execution. Using this information we can perform many useful checks,
such as detecting buffer overflows and null pointer dereferences. [2]
A simple example of using reaching definitions to find buffer overflows is
demonstrated in Listing 3.8. Here, a buffer of 10 elements is defined at line 1,
which is later accessed using an index retrieved from an external source on
line 3. The problem occurs when the index is exactly 10 due to the incorrect
conditional expression at line 5. This is a typical off-by-one error where the
last valid index is sizeof(buf)-1 due to being zero-based. Thus, knowing
what possible values the variable i can have at line 8 provides us with an
opportunity to warn about this defect at compile-time.
Listing 3.8: Detecting a buffer overflow with data-flow analysis.
1 char buf[10];
2
3 int i = get_index_from_user();
4
5 if (i > sizeof(buf))
6 return ’’;
7
8 return buf[i];
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Programming languages featuring arbitrary pointer arithmetic can make
practical data-flow analysis considerably more difficult due to pointer aliasing.
With typical pointer arithmetic, a programmer can create pointers and point
them to any conceivable addresses limited only by the address space. This
makes analysis difficult as two pointers can therefore point to the same address,
or any address for that matter, which means that a program can modify
memory however it pleases. Cases like these are especially important when
tracking pointer use after being freed, because aliasing makes it difficult to
know if and when pointers become invalid. Pointer analysis is not a solved
problem, though, as scalability and precision issues are prevalent these types
of pointer analysis tasks. [33]
3.4.3 Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a formal framework for making semantic approxi-
mations of programs for the purpose of static analysis. The basic idea behind
the method is to choose a suitable abstraction and apply that abstraction
to the program code. This operation will remove the uninteresting parts of
the program in order to make the analysis more manageable. The freedom to
choose an abstraction provides other useful benefits, such as ensuring that an
infinite analysis problem becomes finite and thus solvable. An abstraction like
this is certainly less precise than the concrete problem, but it still provides
us with useful information and in feasible time. Another interesting feature
of abstract interpretation is that the analysis is sound with respect to the
abstraction, i.e., it will find all problems evident in the abstracted program.
[19]
Using abstract interpretation requires one to define the abstraction with
the help of an abstract domain. The abstract domain is defined as D = (L,≤
,⊥,>,unionsq,u), where
• (L,≤) is a partially ordered set with the relation ≤,
• ⊥ is the least element (uL = ⊥),
• > is the greatest element (unionsqL = >),
• unionsq is the join (or least upper bound) operator, and
• u is the meet (or greatest lower bound) operator.
This definition forms a complete lattice, which is a partially ordered set where
each subset X v L has a least upper bound unionsqX and a greatest lower bound
uX.
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The join operator is conveniently analogous to the semantics of program
branching. That is, a branch in the program can be interpreted with a join
operator, thus ensuring that the resulting element after either branch is the
smallest element greater or equal to both original elements. The meet operator
can be defined, but is not required for our examples. Due to the join operator,
these abstractions are flow-insensitive, which means that the control sequence
is ignored and thus do not require complex control-flow handling. Instead, all
possible sequences are considered, which may lead to false positives in case of
implausible control-flows. [16, 59]
Let us consider the example in Listing 3.9. This example uses a simple
abstraction of value signs to detect the possibility of a division by zero. We use
the same abstract domain as Slaby [59] to represent the signs of values. The
abstract domain elements are thus L = {⊕,	, 0,>,⊥}. This abstraction is
similar to the one introduced by Rosendahl [54], except it explicitly introduces
the elements for uninitialized (⊥) and unknown values (>). This abstract
domain forms the lattice illustrated in Figure 3.3. The lattice is ordered using
the relation of subsets (v), i.e., the least element is the empty set (⊥ = ∅),
and the greatest element contains all values of the domain (> = {⊕,	, 0}).
With this simple abstraction, we can try to answer the question if a
division by zero occurs in our example. Essentially, we pose the question: is
n = 0? Through abstract interpretation, we arrive at an answer that maybe
it is, i.e., n = >, which in our chosen abstraction represents an unknown but
initialized value. In this particular case we are uncertain if a division-by-zero
defect is present, but a static analysis tool making this analysis could report
this as a potential issue.
>
	 0 ⊕
⊥
Figure 3.3: Lattice of the sign abstract domain.
More complex cases, such as arbitrarily long loops, can be modeled with
the help of fixed point calculations. In addition to a fixed point, abstractions
with infinite height require the use of a so called widening operator (O). This
operator was introduced by Cousot and Cousot [19] to help solve the infinity
problem by ensuring loop iterations terminate. For example, for integer
intervals, the infinite sequence ([0, 0], [0, 1], . . . , [0,∞]) could be modified to
be finite, e.g., ([0, 0], . . . , [0, 100], [0,∞]). Use of the widening operator makes
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Listing 3.9: Example program containing a possible division by zero.
1 int f(bool c)
2 {
3 int n = 0; // n = 0
4 int a = 10; // a = ⊕
5 int b = −20; // b = 	
6
7 if (c)
8 n = n + a; // n = 0 +⊕ = ⊕
9 else
10 n = n ∗ b; // n = 0 · 	 = 0
11
12 // n = ⊕ unionsq 0 = >
13
14 return a / n; // Is n = 0?
15 }
analysis more imprecise, but presents a reasonable trade-off to ensure the
analysis is completable in finite time.
The development of new numerical abstract domains has been of interest
to academic researchers. In addition to the original interval abstraction by
Cousot and Cousot [19], several new abstractions have been constructed that
have clear advantages over it. These new abstractions are more precise while
still retaining a sensible runtime requirement. One of these is the octagon
abstraction [49], which is able to capture relations between two variables thus
being useful for array bounds checking. Another even more recent abstraction
is the pentagon abstraction [47]. This abstraction is notable for having better
complexity guarantees than the octagon abstraction.
3.4.4 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution, or symbolic simulation [16], is a method of simulating ev-
ery possible execution path of a program. Instead of simulating the execution
by considering every possible variable value, the variables are represented as
symbolic expressions. The analysis tool can then answer queries based on
these symbolic expressions using satisfiability module theorem (SMT) solvers.
This effectively enables the tool to consider every possible value for a variable
with a single program execution thus reducing computational requirements.
To demonstrate symbolic execution, let us consider the function sum in
Listing 3.10 that computes a sum of three variables. The values of each
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variable for a single execution of this function are shown in Table 3.2. The
same case when performing a symbolic execution is detailed in Table 3.3,
which shows the symbolic values that are stored in a symbolic memory [59].
In this case, symbolic execution gives us the necessary insight about the
variables and their relations, so that we can instantly see that the function
returns the sum of a+ b+ c.
Listing 3.10: Function returning the sum of three values.
1 int sum(int a, int b, int c)
2 {
3 int x = a + b;
4 int y = b + c;
5 int z = x + y − b;
6 return z;
7 }
Table 3.2: Normal execution
of sum(1,3,5). A question
mark denotes an uninitial-
ized value and a dash de-
notes an unchanged value.
Line x y z a b c
1 ? ? ? 1 3 5
3 4 - - - - -
4 - 8 - - - -
5 - - 9 - - -
6 return 9
For more difficult cases, such as branches and loops, it is not sufficient to
consider only the variable states. Branching is handled by remembering all
previously encountered branches and the paths taken at those points. The
branch choices are stored as a path condition. The path condition is a boolean
expression over the symbolic input that is updated at every branching point.
[42, 59]
In practice, symbolic execution of larger programs becomes difficult due to
the size of the problem space. Symbolic execution suffers from path explosion
similarly to other execution exploration methods due to program branching.
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Table 3.3: Symbolic execution of sum(α1,α2,α3). A
question mark denotes an uninitialized value and a dash
denotes an unchanged value.
Line x y z a b c
1 ? ? ? α1 α2 α3
3 α1 + α2 - - - - -
4 - α2 + α3 - - - -
5 - - α1 + α2 + α3 - - -
6 return α1 + α2 + α3
Loops are even more troublesome as they can make the execution tree infinite.
Several solutions have been proposed in order to minimize the effect of these
issues. Path explosion can, for example, be alleviated by executing branching
paths in parallel. Another solution is to handle interprocedural symbolic
execution by summarizing each function. [59]
3.4.5 Model Checking
Model checking is the analysis of a program represented as a finite-state
automaton. This formal method for performing analysis is closely related to
program verification where aspects of the program are compared to known
specifications. For the purpose of model checking, the finite-state automaton
is considered as a model.
Many defects can be detected with model checking. To name an exam-
ple, the double-free problem, i.e., the freeing of allocated memory twice, is
detectable with a model checking rule. An example of this rule is illustrated
in Figure 3.4, where the state machine enters an erroneous state in case a
memory address is freed twice. In this simplified example, the model begins at
state q0 where two transitions are possible. If the execution path contains the
free operation, the state transitions to q1. Otherwise, the state remains the
same. At q1 the transitions are the same as in q0, thus when a second free
is encountered the state transitions to q2. Finally, being at q2 means that a
memory address has been freed twice and therefore an error is triggered.
The previous simplified example is only a small part of the whole model.
The task of building a model can be difficult as knowing what aspects of the
programs should be incorporated is not straightforward. One approach by
Fehnker et al. [28] is to constructor a labeled graph from the control-flow
graph. An implementation based on this approach was found to be feasible
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q0start q1 q2free free
Figure 3.4: A finite-state machine detecting the case of double-freed memory.
[16]
even on very large code bases [27].
In practice, models can be represented either explicitly or in a symboli-
cally. Explicit models contain all program states that are discovered through
enumeration. Using explicit models can be impractical due to the demanding
memory requirements. To overcome this issue, one possible solution is to store
states symbolically. This means that interdependent values are represented
as formulaic equivalences, e.g., a⇔ b means that state variables a and b will
always contain the exact same value. [59]
Bounded model checking is similar to model checking, but instead of
completely evaluating the model, a bounded approach is taken. This method
is orthogonal to unbounded model checking as both methods can provide
information about different kinds of program properties. A bounded model
checker works by restricting the state-space exploration to a predefined depth.
If that depth is reached during analysis, one of two separate contingencies
may take place: either the maximum depth is increased and the exploration
continues, or the exploration is simply terminated. In case the maximum
depth is reached and the exploration is terminated, the analysis is typically
left incomplete. The low-level bounded model checker project (LLBMC) is
an implementation of a bounded model checker for intermediate program
bytecode. [59]
3.5 Custom Rules and Checks
Static analysis tools can be divided into extensible and non-extensible tools.
Many simple tools will only check for rules implemented by the author
of the tool, which is useful, but limits the usefulness of the tool in case
of more specific needs. Some of the more advanced static analysis tools
provide ways of implementing additional custom checks using tool-specific rules
[16]. Separating the analysis algorithms from the actual rules being checked
makes static analysis tools extensible and thus more versatile. In addition
to customized rules, some tools support annotations that are embedded in
the source code itself. Both methods, source annotations and custom checks,
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provide useful information to the static analyzer in order to reduce false
positives and to improve the results by checking for increasingly relevant
aspects of the code [66].
The precursor to the Coverity static analysis tool, the xgcc extensible
compiler, uses a high-level state-machine language called metal to give users
a way of writing custom checks [23]. Due to being a high-level language
purposefully created for the purpose of analyzing code, it provides users of
the tool a more straightforward way of implementing custom checks compared
to implementing them directly as C extensions to the xgcc compiler. These
custom checks are linked together with the main xgcc tool in order to be
executed along with it. When the tool is run, it translates source code
functions into its own representation and applies all checks on every possible
execution path.
The metal language is designed to be very extensible and to be a conve-
nient way of implementing custom rules and checks without requiring detailed
knowledge of compiler technology [31]. Listing 3.11 shows an example of a
custom checker written in the metal language detecting the use of freed
memory and double freeing. In this example, the tool represents the call to
kfree(v) as the initial state that then transitions to the state v.freed. If
after the latter state the same pointer is then dereferenced (*v), the state
transitions to v.stop while simultaneously giving an error about a use after
free. The double free check works in an equivalent way.
Having an extensible framework gives users of the system the possibility
of checking for a variety of different problems in source code. Even though it
supports custom checks, using them does not get rid of false positives. To
combat them, xgcc implements pruning of non-executable paths and ranking
of results to improve the quality of output given to users. [31]
Listing 3.11: Free checker implemented with the metal language.
1 state decl any_pointer v;
2
3 start: { kfree(v) } ==> v.freed;
4
5 v.freed: { ∗v } ==> v.stop,
6 { err("using \%s after free!", mc\_identifier(v)); }
7 | { kfree(v) } ==> v.stop,
8 { err("double free of \%s!", mc\_identifier(v)); }
9 ;
These tools, the xgcc compiler and the metal language, have been used
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for finding non-security as well as security related problems in operating
system kernels [4]. A major part of the security related checking was a range
checker tracking the input originating from the user through kernel execution
paths. Tracking this type of input is useful as it can often be passed to system
APIs without sanitizing it. Thus analyzing these situations and finding issues
in them result in many security improvements.
The Microsoft C++ compiler has integrated support for many types of
static analysis checks. Furthermore, the compiler supports an elaborate source
annotation language4 (SAL) that is used by Microsoft in the system libraries.
Larochelle and Evans [44] experimented with a similar solution of annotating
system libraries in order to improve the buffer overflow detection rate in their
LCLint static analyzer. A few examples of these system header annotations
are shown in Listing 3.12 where the parameters of the various character output
functions are annotated.
All the example functions use the _Check_return_opt annotation speci-
fying that checking the return value is optional. This helps the static analyzer
reduce false positives by letting it skip the checking of missing return value
checks for these functions. The printf function takes a format string input
parameter, as annotated by _In_z_ and _Printf_format_string, and a
variable number of arguments containing the values of said format string
placeholders. Differing somewhat from the previous function, the putc func-
tion outputs a character to a FILE handle. In this case, though, the handle
serves both as an input and as an output parameter, as seen from the _Inout_
annotation, due to the function mutating the file handle.
Listing 3.12: Annotations as used in the Microsoft stdio.h header file.
1 _Check_return_opt_ _CRTIMP int __cdecl printf(_In_z_
_Printf_format_string_ const char ∗ _Format, ...);
2 _Check_return_opt_ _CRTIMP int __cdecl putc(_In_ int _Ch, _Inout_ FILE ∗
_File);
3 _Check_return_opt_ _CRTIMP int __cdecl putchar(_In_ int _Ch);
4 _Check_return_opt_ _CRTIMP int __cdecl puts(_In_z_ const char ∗ _Str);
In addition to the aforementioned annotations, SAL supports many addi-
tional types of annotations for a multitude of purposes. As can be seen in the
previous example, these annotations are very useful for improving program
security and robustness. Annotations like these make checking for buffer
overflows in system libraries practically free from the user point of view. The
4http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms182032.aspx
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same annotations are also available for 3rd parties and are documented in
the MSDN article referenced earlier.
The Clang compiler has support many of the language extensions im-
plemented by GCC. One very relevant extension for static analysis is the
attribute system which gives programmers the ability to specify custom at-
tributes for functions and variables. The nonnull function attribute is used by
the compiler for simple cases where obvious null pointers are passed to these
functions. What is interesting is that the static analyzer also understands
this attribute and thus uses it in more complex null pointer checks. Other
attributes, such as noreturn defining a function as never returning, can be
used to help out the static analyzer to perform even better.
Chapter 4
Analyzing Modern C++
Software
This chapter will introduce some of the problems associated with the analysis
of large-scale modern C++ software. These problems include aspects such as
language complexity, tool scalability, and management of the results. We will
also go through a selection of tools and briefly mention their capabilities. A
summary of their capabilities and features will be presented at the end of the
chapter.
4.1 Understanding Code
C++ is a multi-paradigm programming language originally developed by
Bjarne Stroustrup1 in the early 1980s. The language supports object-oriented
programming, generic template programming, and functional programming
paradigms. C++ is also backwards compatible with C, which does not help
its role in the analysis either. As the language supports arbitrary pointer
arithmetic and very lax control-flow manipulation using instructions such
as goto, it prevents analysis tools from making accurate representations of
the semantics [62]. Thus, due to the complex nature of C++, it is not an
easy target for static analysis. This is unfortunate, because the ability to
understand the analyzed code is critical to the tools success [16].
The complexity of parsing C++ has led to the apparent lack of fully
standards compliant language analysis tools. This is evident at least in
the world of open-source tools, where several tools face problems parsing
everything correctly. In languages where introspection is possible, tools do
not have to parse source code themselves. Instead, tool authors can focus on
1http://www.stroustrup.com/
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making tools with the help of existing language facilities. Python provides a
module for manipulating the abstract syntax tree directly, thus making tools
such as Pyflakes2, Pylint3, and PyChecker4 possible.
Currently, existing C++ tools mostly use their own parsers, which is not
ideal as these parsers often lack the means to handle some parts of the
standard language. This can be an issue when using heavily template-based
libraries like Boost5 and the standard template library (STL) itself. Parsing
issues can often mean that the tool misinterprets the syntax and semantics of
a program. Thus, full compatibility with the language standard is very useful
for a tool in order for it to be able to analyze large-scale software.
Recently, the LLVM project6 and the Clang7 compiler, have become an
interesting development in the world of compilers and static analysis tools.
Clang provides a C++ compiler with full standards compliance8. In addition
to a standards compliant compiler, it comes integrated with a static analyzer9.
This analyzer is built on a modular framework and is capable of performing
analysis on C++ source code. What this means, is that we now have a way
of analyzing code with the precision of a compiler in addition to having a
framework for implementing custom checks for our domain-specific needs. [17,
45, 67]
Another way of approaching the language barrier is to not analyze the
source code. Instead, some tools are able to directly analyze intermediate
bytecode generated by compilers. In the case of LLVM, a static analysis tool
called LLBMC is able to perform its analysis on the intermediate bytecode
produced by the compiler Clang family of compilers. This enables to tool to
be generic in a sense and support many programming languages at once. [58]
4.1.1 Language Extensions
While there is generally only one standard language specification, compiler
vendors also provide non-standard extensions with their compiler. These
extensions are sometimes required due to the platform-specific implementation
details of bundled standard libraries. Another common reason is the desire to
include features included in a working draft of the next version of a language
2https://pypi.python.org/pypi/pyflakes
3http://www.pylint.org/
4http://pychecker.sourceforge.net/
5http://www.boost.org/
6http://llvm.org/
7http://clang.llvm.org/
8http://clang.llvm.org/cxx_status.html
9http://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/
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specification. This is often implemented by the compiler vendor as language
extensions for the current compiler. Unfortunately, these extensions are not
always perfectly compatible with the future standard as working drafts tend
to change.
The Microsoft C++ compiler supports many extensions due to its reliance
on platform-specific Windows libraries. Unfortunately, sometimes the use of
these extensions leak outside their required areas, which in turn makes using
only standard language features more difficult. This has created a problem
with software vendors developing cross-platform products. As an example,
the Microsoft compiler supports the sealed keyword, which is identical in
functionality to the final keyword in the next C++ standard. Another
example is the lack of Unicode file name support in standard fstream classes
due to the reliance on UTF-16 on Windows platforms.
The creators of the Coverity products have extensive experience with
these issues. Bessey et al. [9] explain the many issues faced by them during
their development of static analysis tools. The fact is that users of these tools
are not often incentivized to change their code to conform with any form of
standard language, and it is therefore the responsibility of the tool vendor to
support the very divergent nature of different C++ compilers. [9]
4.1.2 Project Configuration
Introducing static analysis tools into old code bases is a source of even more
practical obstacles. One specific problem is the organization of files and the
management of file inclusions across compilation units. Building software
requires the specification of compiler and linker flags in order to aid them in
locating files within the file system [59]. In some cases, such as the Microsoft
C++ compiler, the static analysis tool comes built-in with the compiler. This
alleviates the need to specify compiler flags multiple times for both the
compiler and the analysis tool and so makes the tool deployment significantly
more effortless. In any case, static analysis tools should be able to support
any build system in place at large software projects. Otherwise, tools would
have to be executed manually, which makes day-to-day use impractical and a
burden on developers.
In order to fully analyze production software, static analysis tools should
also be able to analyze 3rd party libraries and headers. Without the infor-
mation and implementation details of these libraries, the analysis tool is
unable to completely understand the program structure. Some help can be
provided by the way of annotations, which is the case in the Microsoft C++
system headers, but annotations can only provide information related to the
boundaries between system and non-system code. In practice, these issues are
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completely ignored due to the unavailability of system level source code and
the difficulty of modifying such code when available [59]. If system libraries
generate warnings, they are typically not going to be fixed, only suppressed.
4.2 Scalability and Precision
In mature software, the code base is typically relatively large and complex.
The size of the code base can become a problem in case it is meant to be
analyzed. Depending on the depth of the analysis and the algorithms used by
the static analysis tool, the large size of the code base may prevent the tool
from finishing its analysis at all. This is often the case with model checkers
and program verifiers, which require a somewhat complete mathematical
model of the program. Other types of tools use internal data structures, such
as abstract syntax trees, that represent the parsed information. The size of
these structures may also lead to considerable and sometimes impractical
memory usage patterns. [59]
While memory usage is often a problem with large code bases, so are
computational costs. The type and thoroughness of the analysis largely
determines its computational cost and complexity. Global analysis, i.e.,
analysis that takes into account intra- and interprocedural data- and control-
flows, are considerably more computationally expensive than simpler analysis
methods, such as pattern matching with regular expressions. The benefit of a
more complex analysis is that it often detects issues that are impossible to
detect otherwise. Static analysis tools are thus left with the choice between
scalability and precision. [14, 16]
4.3 Managing the Results
Using these tools in new projects is only a matter of tool configuration and
decisions on conventions. Configuring such tools to run automatically make
them a constant part of the build process. In a new project, finding new
types of warnings only mean that they are either disabled or made part of
the existing coding conventions. These additions are then part of the natural
evolution of the project-specific coding conventions. The use of many different
tools is also encouraged in new projects due to the small number of warnings.
To give these warnings visibility, they should be combined and presented in
reports suitable for developers. [63]
When static analysis tools are integrated into mature projects, the large
number of warnings often overwhelm developers. As is often the case with
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old software, its code may have been developed using many different coding
conventions and styles. Thus, introducing static analysis tools into this process
will initially give many superfluous results, and the process of reviewing and
filtering them is a manual and laborious task. Prioritizing these issues is
important in order to avoid developers being discouraged to use static analysis
tools. What often follows from this prioritization process is that many of
these issues are found to be low-impact, but they should still be reviewed.
However, sometimes these issues can not be fixed and should thus be removed
from further analysis reports. [5, 37]
One way to work around the influx of the initial warnings is to make
them the baseline reference point to which any future results are compared.
Approaching the problem like this makes future results useful as we are
only informed of the new and fixed warnings in a code base. Although,
it should be noted that this is essentially a stop-gap measure to make the
initial deployment easier. Continuous integration tools provide a convenient
platform for result gathering and report generation.
To further reduce the number of unimportant warnings and false positives,
many tools can be configured to ignore specific issues. Static analysis tools
often have command line options that specify which checks are to be made.
More specific configurations can be done for tools that support source code
annotations. These annotations are inserted as comments or custom attributes
and they give the tools more details about the code semantics. Specific checks
can often also be enabled or disabled through these annotations. Some tools
even have graphical interfaces for suppressing specific warnings. In Visual
Studio 2013, the user can navigate the results and choose which warnings
to disable and a #pragma directive is automatically inserted at the correct
place in the source code.
4.4 Defect Classification
It is useful to classify problems found in software as these classifications make
it easier to document and manage those issues. On a broader scale, Chess [16]
splits defects into two categories: general defects and context-specific defects.
General defects are the ones that do not depend on the business logic and
specific semantics of a program. One prominent example in this category is
the buffer overflow, which can appear regardless of the type and purpose of a
program. Context-specific defects depend on the program semantics and are
thus harder to detect with general-purpose static analysis tools.
Even though these broad categories provide useful information, they are
not always enough. More fine-grained classifications are thus needed in
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order to convey more specific information about defects and vulnerabilities.
Tsipenyuk, Chess, and McGraw [60] devised a taxonomy for defects called the
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms. In this taxonomy defects are categorized into
1. Input validation and representation
2. API abuse
3. Security features
4. Time and state
5. Error handling
6. Code quality
7. Encapsulation
8. Environment
where the eighth category, environment, is actually not part of the source code
at all, but instead contains all vulnerabilities attributed to outside influences.
4.4.1 Common Weakness Enumeration
The MITRE Corporation, a non-profit organization established to aid the
government with technology and engineering, have created the Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE)10. CWE is a list of well known and defined
software weaknesses, more often used by commercial software security analysis
tools to advertise certain feature sets. In our case it provides a useful reference
for describing a list of typical problems plaguing C and C++ software.
To complement the CWE list, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) maintains several test suites of with known vulnerabilities
and defects. This collection of test suites goes by the name of the Software
Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) project11. Each test is
constructed by having a good case, without a defect, and a bad case, with
the defect being tested. Both cases are purposefully very similar in order to
find out if a static analysis tool mistakes a good case as bad, thus reporting a
false positive. CWE codes are given for all tests in the test suite in case one
needs further information about the defect.
10http://cwe.mitre.org/
11http://samate.nist.gov/
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4.5 Static Analysis Tools
Many static analysis tools exist that are able to analyze C++ source code.
These tools come in both open-source and commercial forms. From our
standpoint, this separation is useful as we can make general observations
regarding tools within these categories. The major features of these tools are
summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Overview of static analysis tools.
Name License Languages Type
Clang Open C, C++, Obj-C Semantic
Coverity SAVE Commercial C, C++, C#, Java Semantic
Cppcheck Open C, C++ Semantic
Cpplint Open C, C++ Lexical
Flint Open C, C++ Syntactic
GCC Open C, C++, Obj-C, Java Semantic
Klocwork Insight Commercial C, C++, Java Semantic
LLBMC Commercial C, C++, Obj-C Semantic
PC-lint Commercial C, C++ Semantic
PVS-Studio Commercial C, C++ Semantic
Visual Studio 2013 Commercial C, C++, .NET Semantic
4.5.1 Open-Source Tools
In the world of static analysis, the available tools have typically been com-
mercial. This is especially true for C++ software, where useful and functional
open-source tools have been lacking. Lately, the field of open-source static
analysis has seen some resurgence.
According to a benchmark by Chatzieleftheriou and Katsaros [14], where
four open-source tools and two commercial tools were analyzed, only one of
the open-source tools had similar precision to the commercial tools. This
precision came with a significant cost, as the average runtime of the open-
source tool, Frama-C12, was the highest of all tested tools. Since Frama-C
does not support the C++ language, it is not considered in this thesis.
Historically, compilers have not been very good in providing precise
diagnostics about potential non-syntactical issues in source code. Today, after
significant improvements to modern compiler technology, they are able to
12http://frama-c.com/
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process source code with the necessary detail to analyze it for very specific
issues. These analysis methods are typically enabled through compiler warning
flags that are passed to the compiler during the build process.
4.5.1.1 GCC
The GNU Compiler Collection (GCC13) provides a suite of several compilers
for different programming languages. Its C and C++ compilers are widely
used in the open-source community and they come installed by default in
practically every Linux distribution. It is also available for Windows platforms
through distributions such asMinGW14 and Cygwin15. The major difference
between these distributions is the fact thatMinGW builds native executables
without the need for 3rd party runtime libraries. This benefit does come with
the downside of a lack of full POSIX compatibility.
These compilers come with several documented flags for reporting potential
issues in source code. For example, the -wformat flag enables format string
verification for printf, scanf, etc. Another warning, which is actually
enabled by default, is the compile-time division by zero check. The compiler
also supports source code annotations in the form of custom attributes. One
very interesting attribute is the nonnull attribute, which can be used on
function parameters. Functions where these non-null parameter exist are
checked by the compiler in case they are called with null arguments.
One of the more interesting compiler flags for analysis purposes is the
-fsyntax-only flag. With this flag the compiler is instructed to only check
for syntax errors. In addition to this, the compiler also reports warnings with
this flag enabled. This is very useful for analysis as the compiler can then be
used as a pure static analyzer without code generation. Unfortunately, GCC
does not instantiate C++ templates when this flag is enabled, thus making it
less than ideal as a static analyzer.
4.5.1.2 Clang
Clang is an open-source C, C++, and Objective-C front-end for the LLVM
compiler framework. The compiler has by design a very similar set of options
as GCC due to it being intentionally built as a drop-in replacement. In
addition to the normal warning levels and reporting options provided by the
compiler, it also features a more in-depth static analysis component. This
static analyzer supports creating checks that work on the abstract syntax tree
13http://gcc.gnu.org/
14http://www.mingw.org/
15http://www.cygwin.com/
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(AST) provided by the compiler. The checkers are implemented as visitors
that traverse the AST and visit the nodes in it.
As a practical example, a custom checker16 using the Clang static analysis
framework exists for the well-known Heartbleed vulnerability. This vulnera-
bility is the consequence of a buffer over-read in the open-source cryptography
library OpenSSL17. The checker identifies uses of the POSIX byte order
conversion functions ntohl/ntohs and taints the data returned by them.
Then, any unconstrained use of this tainted data in functions like memcpy
are reported. This checker demonstrates the versatility of the Clang static
analysis framework for finding more specific vulnerabilities.
Another extension mechanism is with the help of the LibTooling18
library. This library is designed to be the basis of more full-featured tools. It
provides a simple way of accessing the compiler front-end and its configuration.
Several tools have been built with this library that come as part of the source
distribution. clang-check is a command line application that functions as a
simple syntax checker and interface to the static analyzer. Other useful tools,
like the source code formatter clang-format, use the library as well.
A script, scan-build, works as a wrapper around the compiler front-end.
This script enables one to use existing project Makefiles as the wrapper
intercepts calls to the compiler replacing them with calls to the analyzer.
After the code has been analyzed, the script writes an HTML file for each
issue it finds. These HTML reports give clear and structured interpretations
of the context leading to each specific issue.
Even though the suggested usage is through this script, one can also use
the compiler directly by passing the relevant command line flags to it. This
is necessary for using the analyzer on platforms where the wrapper does not
work correctly, such as Windows. It should be noted that this method of
invocation is currently unsupported.
The static analyzer has many built-in checks ready to use. Currently
these are grouped into categories that can be enabled through command line
options. These categories are
• alpha for experimental checks,
• core for general purpose checks,
• cplusplus for C++-specific checks,
16http://blog.trailofbits.com/2014/04/27/using-static-analysis-and-clang-to-find-
heartbleed/
17http://www.openssl.org/
18http://clang.llvm.org/docs/LibTooling.html
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• deadcode for detecting dead code,
• osx for Objective-C and Apple SDK related checks,
• security for insecure API usage checks, and
• unix for Unix and POSIX checks.
4.5.1.3 Cppcheck
Originally created by Daniel Marjamäki, Cppcheck is an open-source static
analysis tool that has been part of several benchmarks [14, 24, 40, 59].
The software comes in both a command line version as well as a graphical
version, shown in Figure 4.1. Both versions use the same analysis engine
and thus have identical checks, although the command line version is more
suitable for automated analysis due to it being easier to run in non-interactive
environments.
Figure 4.1: An example of the Cppcheck graphical user interface showing
several warnings.
The analyzer builds a simplified abstract syntax tree (AST) using its own
custom parser and lexical analysis, and may therefore not always conform
to the latest C++ standard due to bugs or lack of features. To support more
elaborate checks, the latest version (1.64) implements a generic data-flow
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tracking framework. This new framework supports general-purpose context-
sensitive interprocedural data-flow analysis and can be used by individual
checkers. Many checkers have been modified to use this new system, although
some old checkers still use their own specific data-flow tracking. The framework
also performs abstract interpretation when tracking values in loops.
There are two very different extension mechanisms in Cppcheck for
creating custom checks. One way to create them is by modifying the source
code to create new C++ classes containing the desired checks. These classes
work as visitors on the tokenized AST stream. In addition to this method,
custom checks can also be created by specifying regular expression in an XML
formatted configuration file. The regular expressions are used find defects by
matching them against the token stream. Although convenient, these regular
expressions do not provide the same capabilities as the source modifying
method.
The analyzer comes with many different checkers. These checkers are
categorized by their severity. Program options are available for enabling or
disabling checks by their severities. These severities are
• error for more severe issues like syntax errors,
• warning for suggestions about possible problems,
• style for dead code and other stylistic issues,
• performance for some common performance related suggestions,
• portability for 64-bit and general platform portability issues, and
• information for informational messages about problems with the analy-
sis.
Cppcheck is also able to give even more warnings if enabled with the
--inconclusive flag. This flag enables, as the name suggests, inconclusive
checks where the analyzer might not be completely sure about the existence
of a problem. By enabling this flag, some previously hidden problems might
be detected while significantly increasing the number of false positives.
4.5.1.4 Cpplint
Originating from Google, Cpplint19 is a code analysis and style checking
program that enforces the Google C++ Style Guide20. This program, written
19http://google-styleguide.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/cpplint/cpplint.py
20http://google-styleguide.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/cppguide.xml
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in Python, uses a mixture of regular expression matching and other line based
heuristics to detect various problems in the analyzed code. It mostly detects
style issues, whitespace irregularities, and various other potential problems.
Due to its simplicity, it analyzes even large projects relatively fast.
As it is a style convention checking tool created for Google projects,
like Chromium21, its use is somewhat limited for general-purpose analysis.
Fortunately, irrelevant checks can be disabled through the use of command
line flags. In addition to individual checks, whole categories of checks can be
enabled or disabled. The currently existing categories are
• build for build and preprocessing issues,
• legal for missing copyright messages,
• readability for correct but unreadable code,
• runtime for runtime related issues, and
• whitespace for whitespace usage conventions.
4.5.1.5 Flint
Flint22 is a static analysis tool recently open-sourced by Facebook. It
was previously developed in C++, but has since been converted to the D
programming language23. This resulted in smaller code and better runtime
efficiency due to the use of compile-time code generation features specific to
D. Instead of building a tree, the tool converts source code into an array of
tokens. Checkers can then traverse this token array and navigate it looking
for specific tokens.
The tool is equipped with several preexisting checkers, e.g,
• checkBlacklistedSequences checks for blacklisted token sequences such
as volatile while still allowing asm volatile,
• checkBlacklistedIdentifiers checks the use of blacklisted identifiers like
strtok,
• checkDefinedNames checks identifier naming for illegal use of implemen-
tation reserved underscores,
21http://www.chromium.org/
22https://code.facebook.com/posts/729709347050548/under-the-hood-building-and-
open-sourcing-flint/
23http://dlang.org/
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• checkIncludeGuard checks for missing include guards in either #pragma
or #ifdef form, and
• checkMemset checks for the correct order of the memset function pa-
rameters.
These are only five of the 25 available checkers in the initial open-sourced
version.
4.5.2 Commercial Tools
Several commercial static analysis tools have been made since the creation of
the first lint-type tools. These commercial tools are typically either smaller
standalone tools or parts of a larger suite of tools. With the significant costs
of some of these tools comes useful benefits like extensive on-site support, tool
customization, and project-specific tuning for the customer. It is also typical
that the tools have a more security focused marketing while also supporting
many style- and performance-oriented checks. The more affordable tools
listed here are smaller self-contained utilities that have simple command-line
interfaces. Often times they can also be accessed from within integrated
development environments.
4.5.2.1 Coverity SAVE
Coverity Static Analysis Verification Engine (Coverity SAVE24), is a static
analysis tool developed by Coverity Inc. This analyzer is a part of a larger
product suite supporting languages such as C, C++, C#, and Java. Their
static analysis tool is a based on the Stanford Checker developed at Stanford
University by Hallem et al. [31]. It is notable for being used by several open
source projects through a common web interface25. The open source analysis
effort was contracted by the United States Department of Homeland Security
in order to improve the security of software essential to the foundation of the
Internet. According to Bessey et al. [9], their tool supports a multitude of
languages and vendor-specific language variations. This is important in order
to analyze many legacy and proprietary software systems as they are often
implemented with non-standard programming language versions.
Although the algorithms used in Coverity SAVE are proprietary and
thus unknown to us, its precursor, the Stanford Checker uses a depth-first
search to construct a control-flow graph by traversing the abstract syntax
24http://www.coverity.com/products/coverity-save/
25http://scan.coverity.com/
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tree of the source code. The Stanford Checker speeds up interprocedural
analysis by caching block level state changes. This enables the tool to skip
over already analyzed blocks by using the cached state as a summary of how
the block modifies the state. [31]
The tool itself is unsound, i.e., it does not prove the absence of bugs
and problems, but instead strives to find as many bugs as possible. Even
though unsoundness is an unfavorable feature in the theoretical sense, it
is commonplace in static analysis tools as it makes problematic language
constructs and the inevitable false positives easier to handle. It also allows
tool developers to focus primarily on finding new types of defects even if
the analyzer is sometimes mistaken. Earlier versions of the static analysis
tool by Coverity, Coverity Prevent, used function-level summaries in
its interprocedural data-flow analysis. Additionally, it also applied statical
inference methods to detect possible problems in code. [3]
4.5.2.2 Klocwork Insight
Klocwork Insight26 is a product suite made by Klocwork Inc. for code
analysis, metrics, reporting, and refactoring. The tools in the suite are pro-
vided as generic desktop applications and as extensions for various integrated
development environments, such as Visual Studio and Eclipse. Languages
supported include C, C++, and Java, and all these can be used in the same
project due to its multi-language analysis.
A previous version of the product, K7, was used to find problems in the
open source Samba project. Together with the Coverity static analysis tool,
they found a handful of issues, which were later fixed. Notably, K7 found
more than 150 possible vulnerabilities after other tools had already analyzed
the code. [29, 52]
K7 is also known to have interprocedural analysis capabilities and very
useful extension mechanisms. By making extensions, customers are able to
create new checks specific to their needs. In addition to the static analysis
features, the product suite can also help with architectural analysis. Using
code metrics and complexity analysis, the tools are able to give developers
valuable information about the status of their code. This information is
helpful for program understanding through various visualizations. [64]
4.5.2.3 LLBMC
LLBMC (or low-level bounded model checker) is a static analysis tool that
analyses the bytecode produced by the Clang compiler. This means that
26http://www.klocwork.com/products/insight/
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it is language independent, although, many language-specific features need
explicit modeling work so that the bounded model checker is able to analyze
them. By analyzing bytecode, the tool bypasses the need to specifically
understand high-level programming languages, which is a useful property
especially considering complex languages like C++. The analyzed bytecode is
in the LLVM-IR format, which is an intermediate abstract assembler code
output by the LLVM family of compilers, such as Clang.
Before this bytecode can be analyzed, it has to be transformed into a
suitable form for model checking as illustrated in Figure 4.2. First, the control
flow is simplified by unrolling loops and inlining functions. Then, the bytecode
is encoded into ILR, an intermediate logic representation used by LLBMC to
represent programs in the form of bit-vectors and arrays. This representation
is essential as it gives us state objects for memory contents. Additional
state objects describe the state of the memory allocation system in order to
encode logical dependencies between instructions accessing memory. This
way, memory access patterns incorporating the original LLVM read/write
operations are explicitly encoded in the IRL in an ordering-independent
fashion. Finally, the ILR is furthermore simplified by rewriting memory
access patterns in order to reduce them into bit-vector formulas for correctness
evaluation through the use of a satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solver. [58]
LLBMC uses a flat array-based memory model which enables it to
properly support weakly typed languages, like C and C++, where a pointer
can be cast to represent a pointer of basically any other type. It is thus very
proficient in detecting buffer overflows, integer overflows, and memory errors
[58]. To make solving the program model feasible, loops are unrolled to a
predetermined iteration count and recursive function call depths are limited.
The LLBMC tool has been successfully used in the software verification
competition SV-COMP 2013, where it took second place in four categories
[26].
C program LLVM-IR LLVM-IR ILR ILR SAT / UNSAT
Compile Unroll &Inline Encode Simplify Solve
Figure 4.2: The source code transformation pipeline of LLBMC. [48]
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4.5.2.4 PC-lint
PC-lint27, by Gimpel Software, was created in 1985 to be a DOS-based
equivalent to the Unix lint tool. Initially, its purpose was to do basic type
checking by comparing the used function arguments to their respective function
parameters. Since then, the tool has gained several new advanced features,
such as strong type checking with dimensional analysis and global analysis
capabilities with interprocedural value tracking.
In the later versions, message suppression was improved by giving the
users of the tool ways to hide messages in specific contexts. As a large
number of warnings can be detrimental for the eventual adoption of a static
analysis tool, this development proved to be very beneficial. Messages can
be suppressed with command line options or within source code comments.
These suppressions can be tailored to consider only specific contexts, such as
C macros.
In order to provide interprocedural value tracking, PC-lint builds a global
call graph by scanning the whole source code. This is built as a multi-pass
analysis by having a primary general walk go through the call graph while
simultaneously recording every possible function argument value. In the next
step specific walks are performed on the same call graph using the previously
recorded values. Thus, each specific walk is essentially performing a simplified
data-flow analysis.
PC-lint is notable for its long history and its support for a wide variety of
C and C++ language dialects. It also has built-in options for enabling detection
of issues related to the MISRA28, CERT29, and other secure programming
specifications. Additionally, a version of the tool called FlexeLint is provided
in source form to make it as portable as possible. [30]
4.5.2.5 PVS-Studio and CppCat
PVS-Studio and CppCat are both static analysis products developed by
the Product Verification Systems30 company. PVS-Studio consists of three
distinct analyzers: 64-bit portability, multiprocessing, and general analysis.
The former two are older products previously developed as separate products
Viva64 and VivaMP. This tool can be used either through a standalone
graphical interface, illustrated in Figure 4.3, or as an extension to the Visual
Studio integrated development environment.
27http://www.gimpel.com/html/pcl.htm
28http://www.misra.org.uk/
29https://www.securecoding.cert.org/
30http://www.viva64.com/
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Figure 4.3: The PVS-Studio standalone user interface showing issues from
DynaRoad.
PVS-Studio uses a heavily modified C++ front-end called OpenC++31.
This C++ front-end handles the lexical analysis and parsing of the source code.
Furthermore, two different choices for preprocessing source code are supported:
the Microsoft compiler and Clang. It is noteworthy to understand that
this choice only decides which compiler is used for preprocessing and not for
general parsing. The Clang preprocessor is faster, but may in some cases fail
to handle Microsoft-specific language extensions. In that case PVS-Studio
will fall back to using the slower Microsoft compiler.
CppCat is a simplified version of the same product. Its purpose is to
provide a straightforward interface to some of the same underlying analyzers
that are contained within the PVS-Studio package. Notable changes are
the omissions of the 64-bit portability and multiprocessing analyzers.
4.5.2.6 Visual Studio 2013
Visual Studio 201332 is an integrated development environment (IDE)
developed by Microsoft supporting multiple programming languages for Win-
dows development. Among other tools, it comes bundled with a static analyzer
31http://opencxx.sourceforge.net/
32http://www.visualstudio.com/
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for C++ and C# projects. This tool was first introduced in Visual Studio
2005 and was a continuation of the PREfast static analysis tool created at
Microsoft Research [16]. A sample output of the static analyzer in Visual
Studio 2013 is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: The Visual Studio 2013 static analyzer detecting the presence of
a null pointer dereference.
Initially only bundled with the Windows Driver Development Kit (DDK),
the PREfast analyzer supports a simple pattern matching and some data-
flow sensitive checks, such null pointer dereference checking. PREfast and
thus the Visual Studio 2013 static analyzers are only capable of local
intraprocedural analysis, i.e., they are unable to analyze data-flow across
function calls. To find simple programming mistakes, the tool detects the
presence of predefined bug patterns in the abstract syntax tree. Both tools
understand the Standard Annotation Language (SAL), which helps them
gain additional information about program semantics. [56]
PREfast is a “faster” version of the similarly named PREfix tool. The
main difference being that PREfix is able to perform interprocedural analysis
thus rendering it more capable in finding software defects. This does mean
that the analysis takes significantly more time, which is why the tool is meant
to be run server-side. [51]
To remove the need for repeated checking of the same functions, PREfix
symbolically executes leaf functions and caches function-level summaries. The
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symbolic execution state is stored in a virtual machine, which is then analyzed
for potential defects. Once leaf functions have been summarized, the analysis
continues upwards the calling graph to the callers of these functions. [12]
Chapter 5
DynaRoad Software
This chapter introduces the target of the analysis in this thesis, the Dy-
naRoad software. We will make a brief overview of the major features and
capabilities of the software. The following sections will elaborate on the
technical aspects and architecture of the software. Finally, we will go over
the current build process and how we feel it can be improved.
5.1 Features
DynaRoad is a project scheduling and management software developed by
DynaRoad Oy aimed mainly at road construction projects. It has seen use in
several major road construction projects around the world. It is also used in
schools and universities as a teaching tool for civil engineers.
The software itself is a Windows desktop application providing the user
with a graphical user interface. The user is able to create new construction
projects by importing mass volume data, also called a bill of materials,
directly from preexisting Excel files. These files are generated by exporting
the data from other construction design programs. When a project has been
created and embedded with sufficient data, such as material types, tasks, and
resources, a project designer can then use automated tools for calculating
optimized mass haul plans.
The software is comprised of three distinct modules: planning, scheduling,
and controlling. Planning module gives project designers the tools to construct
a project from non-temporal tasks. Non-temporal tasks are tasks that lack
scheduling information. Such tasks are adequate for mass haulage planning.
The scheduling module augments these tasks with scheduling information like
start times, finish times, and dependencies. With this the designer is able
to plan a schedule for the whole project taking into account resource usage
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and costs. When the project is finally scheduled, the third module comes
into play. This module is focused on the controlling aspects of projects in
progress. Visualizations of aspects such as forecasts, scheduling conflicts, and
task completion degrees help project managers steer their projects closer to
their plans.
Optimization is a major part of the software, which is why DynaRoad
gives users two distinct ways of optimizing their project. The two methods
are separate due to their use of different data for their optimizations. The
first method uses linear programming to find optimal mass hauls plans by
minimizing haul costs. This method ignores scheduling data, such as task
timing and resource production rates, as this information is not necessary
for plan calculation. Mass haul plans contain mass haul quantities and
destinations for each task. Sometimes mass requires processing before it can
be used and is therefore hauled through multiple locations, thus creating haul
chains.
The second optimization method is very similar to the first, but instead of
ignoring scheduling data, it is included. Due to scheduling data being taken
into account, the optimal plan now establishes a realizable project schedule
in addition to minimizing its mass haul costs. Previously, DynaRoad
supported an optimization method implemented with a genetic algorithm,
but that method has since been replaced with the linear optimization method
explain above. [39]
Several graphical views provide the user with useful insight on the current
and future status of a project:
Mass haul view
A view for visualizing the mass distribution crosscut along a road.
Mass curve view
Displays the cumulative sum of mass along a road.
Time-location view
Shows the correlation between location-based task progress and time.
A demonstration of the time-location view can be seen in Figure 5.1.
Gantt view
A view showing the start and finish times of each task in a task hierarchy.
This view is very common in project management software.
Resource view
Shows resource usage at various points of time. Is useful for resource
overallocation prevention.
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Map view
Overlays the project on a geographical map while positioning tasks and
other locations at their actual real-world coordinates. Figure 5.2 shows
an example output of the map view for a sample project.
Control view
Used for visualizing the status of an in-progress project. Shows tasks
and their status compared to their planned schedule, i.e., is the task
late, in time, or not started.
Figure 5.1: DynaRoad displaying the time-location view of a simple project.
5.2 Technical Overview
The software is comprised of two main architectural modules: the kernel
and the user interface (UI). The kernel implements the domain model of
the software. Each domain concept is implemented as a collection of C++
classes and other data structures, e.g., class RoadLine for project road lines.
One factor that has remained important during the implementation of kernel
functionality, is the aversion of adding UI and platform-specific library de-
pendencies. This lack of UI dependencies is very useful in light of the fact
that it makes these classes testable using automatic non-interactive testing
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Figure 5.2: DynaRoad output of the map view showing construction areas
and their locations on a real-world map.
tools. Thus, the kernel presents a self-contained public facing API to other
parts of the architecture, most notably the UI.
The software is developed in C++ as a Windows desktop application.
The user interface is implemented with the Microsoft Foundation Class1
(MFC) library. MFC is an application framework for Windows programs
providing helper classes for common tasks, such as 2D graphics, printing, and
document serialization. MFC has a long history and is still supported and
maintained by Microsoft. Newer, more modern libraries have been developed
by Microsoft, but not for C++ software. Since the introduction of the C#
language, libraries such as WinForms and WPF have been introduced as
being more approachable ways for developing Windows applications. Due
to the prevalence of legacy applications and the continuing interest in C++
application development from a performance standpoint, many applications
retain the dependency to MFC. Currently, most of the interface visible to
the user is implemented with MFC. The Cairo2 graphics library is used to
draw 2D graphics for vector graphics exporting needs.
In addition to the two main architectural tiers, a separate service layer
provides technical services, including license management and Excel file
manipulation. The service layer is tested as part of the automated testing
1http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fe1cf721(v=vs.110).aspx
2http://www.cairographics.org/
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suite. Due to the design of the libraries in this layer, they are relatively easy
to test automatically.
5.3 Build Process
The current software build process is implemented as a single-part build
pipeline in an instance of the Jenkins3 continuous integration software. A
normal run of the pipeline goes as follows:
1. A developer commits new source code to the source code repository.
2. The Jenkins server polls the repository and notices the new commit
thus updating its local working copy.
3. Jenkins begins the build process by executing a build command with
the MSBuild project file residing in the working copy.
(a) MSBuild starts by compiling and linking the automated unit
testing executable.
(b) The automated test executable is run and the results are gathered
by Jenkins for later reporting.
(c) In case the tests are successful, the main executable is compiled
and linked.
(d) The main executable is packaged along with any required external
data files in a Microsoft Installer (.msi) file and as a 7-zip4 archive.
4. The resulting output files are archived in storage.
5. Build warnings, errors, and test results are then reported in the Jenkins
build system.
5.4 Existing Analyzers
The DynaRoad code base is analyzed by a collection of Subversion5 post-
commit scripts and nightly shell scripts. The Subversion post-commit hooks
are responsible for checking coding style conventions and documentation
spelling errors. Due to the post-commit hooks blocking the commit procedure,
3http://jenkins-ci.org/
4http://www.7-zip.org/
5http://subversion.apache.org/
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these particular tasks have to be done relatively quickly. Lengthy analysis
scripts are run during the night when computer resources are required the
least. These nightly scripts can thus analyzed code more thoroughly than
scripts run as post-commit hooks. Currently, only one static analysis tool,
Cppcheck, is run nightly.
One of the most useful existing post-commit script is a script written
in Perl. Perl is a programming language well-known for its usefulness in
handling textual data. Basically, this script contains a list of predefines
regular expressions that are matched against the source code. Any matches
found by the script are reported as warnings. These warnings are accumulated
in a text file, which is then e-mailed nightly to all developers. Reoccurring
e-mail messages provide a great incentive for fixing any remaining issues.
A notable part of the current analysis setup is the treatment of compiler
warnings in DynaRoad. Compilers provide helpful information on suspect
and possibly defective code. Modern compilers have a large number of
warnings that can be enabled using command line options. DynaRoad
is compiled with the highest warning level possible and those warnings are
treated by the build system as errors. This makes it impossible to introduce
code that produces warnings and makes for a very clean code base.
5.5 Potential Improvements
Our existing checks have shown to be of great use for detecting potential
issues in coding style and correctness. Unfortunately, using post-commit
hooks is not future-proof as it makes moving between version control systems
more difficult. In addition to this, it is very useful to systematically store the
results of the static analysis tools for historical inspection. These historical
records can be used to generate warning count trends and graphs, which helps
the inspection of the software development process. A logical solution is to
move the contents of all post-commit hooks into the source tree. To do this,
the build files have to execute the analysis tools themselves. Additionally, due
to build files typically being stored in a version control systems, the command
line options for these tools are therefore also conveniently version controlled.
Having the static analysis tool execution information in the build file makes it
possible for developers to launch the analysis tools themselves on their local
computer. This improves productivity by avoiding the need for developers to
wait for the execution of post-commit hooks.
Moving the static analysis tool execution to the build file itself makes it
possible to specify exactly which checks are being run and when. A continuous
integration server is suitable for this task as it can be configured to execute
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builds with specific command line options by creating build jobs. Build jobs
are either run after a commit or scheduled to run at specific times in a
similar fashion to the UNIX Cron daemon. This centralizes the execution
of external static analysis tools onto the continuous integration server.
Further improvements to the software engineering process are possible by
increasing the number of used static analysis tools. The best case scenario is
to run as many tools as possible while still considering the practical time and
scalability limitations of these tools. Tools having long execution times that
provide very little useful information can easily be ignored.
Chapter 6
Static Analysis Tool Evaluation
In this thesis we evaluated several freely available static analysis tools in order
to find out about their practical usefulness in our software engineering process.
This chapter is divided into three parts: an evaluation of the detection accuracy
of several tools in synthetic tests, an evaluation of real-world detection
capabilities, and an investigation into build process improvements.
We chose four open-source and two commercial static analysis tools. All
tools were chosen on the basis of having some level of C++ support and being
either open-source or free to evaluate. The chosen tools and their respective
versions are listed in Table 6.1. Note that we chose to leave some potential
tools out of this evaluation due to their lack of features or unavailability for
our required platforms. PC-lint currently lacks support for the latest C++
standard. CppCat is a stripped down version of PVS-Studio. LLBMC is
not available on Windows platforms.
Table 6.1: List of the evaluated tools, their versions, and download
locations.
Name Version Location
Clang r203645 http://clang.llvm.org/
Cppcheck 1.64 http://cppcheck.sourceforge.net/
Cpplint r119 http://google-styleguide.googlecode.com/
Flint g9cefb19 https://github.com/facebook/flint/
PVS 5.16.10324.3 http://www.viva64.com/en/pvs-studio/
VS2013 12.0.21005.1 http://www.visualstudio.com/
In order to evaluate the defect detection efficiency of each tool, we built a
synthetic test suite specifically designed to point out what each tool was able to
detect. After that, we set out to gather information of the detection efficiency
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in a real-world setting by doing a differential analysis on our code base. A
large-scale evaluation like this requires, in addition to a well-functioning
detection engine, that the tool is scalable enough to handle large amounts of
source code. Finally, for each tool the possibility of integrating it into our
continuous integration environment was investigated.
6.1 Synthetic Tests
Creating a suitable test suite of synthetic tests for the purpose of benchmarking
static analysis tools has been shown to be a nontrivial task. The reason for
this is the large variety of detection mechanisms an algorithms used in these
tools, which lead to vastly different end results in detection accuracy. Ideally,
such tests would contain every possible variation of the defect being tested.
Unfortunately, creating such large test suites would lead to a combinatorial
explosion in number of test cases. To give an example, the latest version (1.2)
of the Juliet Test Suite for C/C++1 contains 61,387 test cases that contain
only 118 different defects. This means that there are, on average, over 500
test cases for each defect with different data- and control-flow patterns. [11,
20]
For our evaluation we settled for a much smaller set of defects and test
cases to keep the evaluation manageable and in order to meet time constraints.
We chose 19 defects from the MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
list and 11 rules and recommendations from the CERT C and C++ Secure
Coding Standards. Many of these defects were also used in the benchmark by
Chatzieleftheriou and Katsaros [14], which is a similar comparative evaluation
where the features of several static analysis tools were compared and tested
with a synthetic test suite. An evaluation with known test cases provides
valuable information on the actual detection accuracy in different defect
categories.
A detailed description of each test case is presented in Appendix A. The 30
defects and programming mistakes were each contained within their individual
C++ source files. These files only tested the ability of the static analysis tools
to detect the presence of problems, not their absence. According to Schmeelk
[55], small self-contained tests like these are microbenchmarks, i.e., synthetic
test cases not lifted from real-world programs. As such, they only measure
defect detection accuracy and not, for example, runtime performance.
The test suite was designed to contain many typical security and C++-
specific problems. Instances of them have been found in our own code
base in the past. These are typical problems, such as use-after-free, double
1http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/testsuite.php
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free, memory leaks, buffer overflows, use of dangerous functions, and race
conditions. Issues like these exist in both C and C++ software, where memory
management is left to the programmer and strings are basically character
arrays of arbitrary length. C++ provides alternatives that alleviate these exact
cases, but their use is not required by the language.
It should be noted that none of these test cases contain syntax errors, i.e.,
standards-compliant compilers should be able to successfully compile each
one of them. Both Clang and the VS2013 compilers were able to compile
each case without syntax errors. Although, in some cases the compiler refused
to compile obvious statically detectable problems, such as integer divisions
by zero. Each tool was run with most warnings enabled as summarized in
Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Options used in the synthetic test evaluation.
Name Options
Clang -Weverything -pedantic -std=c++11,
-analyzer-checker=core,cplusplus,deadcode,security
Cppcheck --enable=all --library=std.cfg
Cpplint --filter=-whitespace,-legal
Flint N/A
PVS All warnings (1, 2, 3) and analyzers (GA, OP, 64, MP, CS)
VS2013 Warning level 4, Microsoft All Rules preset
6.1.1 Results
A summary of the results for the CWE-part of the synthetic tests is show
in Table 6.3. Another summary, shown in Table 6.4, contains the results of
the synthetic tests for the CERT secure coding test cases. By looking at the
results, we noticed that no tool was able to find every possible problem.
The compilers and their integrated analyzers, Clang and VS2013, to-
gether with the more complex analysis tools, Cppcheck and PVS-Studio,
were able to find most of the CWE defects. Cpplint, being mostly a style
and coding convention checking tool, was not able to detect most of the CWE
defects. Flint does not come bundled with many checkers out-of-the-box
and therefore did not perform too well in this evaluation.
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All tools were capable of finding instances of at least some violations
of the CERT secure coding guidelines being tested. These tests require a
deeper knowledge of the C++ language and are thus difficult to detect without
dedicated checkers. It should be noted that some of the guidelines are more
stylistic in nature and therefore do not have widespread support among static
analysis tools.
6.2 Differential Analysis
The second part of the evaluation was a comparison of the tool reported warn-
ings against actual defects found and fixed in various revisions of DynaRoad.
For this evaluation, we chose six consecutive versions of the stable branch of
DynaRoad. All versions were minor point releases of the 5.3 version and all
of them contained various types of bug fixes and minor feature additions. For
each version the number of fixed known crash defects was recorded and kept
as a reference.
The issues reported by each tool were logged by a version-by-version basis.
Comparing the logged issues from release version to release version gave us
insight in how these tools are able to detect real-world problems. Similarly
to the synthetic evaluation, Table 6.5 shows that our goal was to enable as
many checkers as possible for each tool.
Table 6.5: Options used in the differential analysis evaluation.
Name Options
Clang -Wall, -analyzer-checker=core,cplusplus,deadcode,
security
Cppcheck --enable=warning,style,performance,portability
--library=std.cfg --library=windows.cfg
Cpplint runtime
Flint N/A
PVS All warnings (1, 2, 3) and analyzers (GA, OP, 64, MP, CS)
For each tool, the differences in the generated reports were searched for
known crash defects in specific program versions. A similar version-by-version
evaluation was done by Wedyan, Alrmuny, and Bieman [65] for Java-based
static analysis, where only 3% of reported issues were detected by the tools.
In our case, this type of evaluation was beneficial as it did not require us to
have perfect knowledge of every existing problem in the code base. This is
especially useful for mature large-scale software, such as DynaRoad.
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So, we settled for an imperfect knowledge evaluation by analyzing different
version of the same software. The information we gathered gave us a general
feel on how useful these tools are for finding actual bugs. We then classified
these results into true positives and false negatives. True positives were defects
detected by the tool and fixed in the next program version. False negatives
were defects not detected by the tool that were fixed in the next program
version. One should note that we purposefully left out problems found by
the tools that were not fixed as we needed a clear picture on how these tools
could have eliminated known issues during development.
6.2.1 Results
All tools reported many warnings of varying severities as shown in Table 6.6.
No results were available for VS2013 because the code base would have
required modifications to accommodate the newer compiler. Comparing the
output of the tools, we found that none of them was able to detect any of the
crash defects fixed between versions. No previously unknown crash defects
were found either. The number of known crash defects in each version is
summarized in Table 6.7 with detailed descriptions of each bug in Appendix B.
Table 6.6: Number of warnings for each DynaRoad version.
Version Clang Cppcheck Cpplint Flint PVS
5.3.0 150 77 236 264 3032
5.3.1 152 77 237 266 3041
5.3.2 152 77 239 266 3046
5.3.3 154 82 241 264 3049
5.3.4 154 82 242 264 3051
5.3.5 159 91 250 267 3071
To find out what the most frequent warning issued by each tool was, we
grouped and sorted the warnings from DynaRoad version 5.3.0 by their
category. As can be seen in Table 6.8, the most frequent warnings were not
very relevant to our analysis. Clang warned mostly about class constructor
initialization lists being in the wrong order. The most frequent warning issued
by Cppcheck was about function parameters being passed by value instead
of constant references. Cpplint being a style-focused checker warned mostly
about the use of C-style casts. Flint was previously modified to suppress the
association header warning due to our use of precompiled headers, but despite
the modification, it was still the most frequent warning. Interestingly, PVS-
Studio gave many warnings about code fragments not being analyzed, which
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Table 6.7: Number of known crash
defects in each DynaRoad ver-
sion.
Version Known Crash Defects
5.3.0 3
5.3.1 3
5.3.2 4
5.3.3 1
5.3.4 1
5.3.5 6
according to the vendor, are the result of erroneous template instantiations,
errors in the C++ preprocessor, or a problems in the analyzer itself.
6.3 Build Process Integration and Reporting
We integrated three static analysis tools into our build: Cppcheck, Cpplint,
and Flint. Clang integration was postponed as eliminating all the syntax
errors reported by it would have required several modifications to our code
base. For similar reasons we also left out VS2013, which would have required
us to upgrade our code base from an older version of the compiler. PVS-
Studio was not integrated as its use in production requires a commercial
license.
To begin, we modified the project build file by adding a custom build
target for these checks named Check. This target depends on three other
targets that each execute their respective static analysis tool. One specific
detail that had to be noted between these tools was their capability of doing
global analysis. If a tool was capable of such analysis, like Cppcheck, then it
was executed by giving it paths instead of running it separately for each file.
This decision also affects the execution time due to the way a new process
of the tool is spawned for each file if analyzed separately. All tools were
configured to finally output their results into a common report directory.
Our build process was based on the Jenkins continuous integration
software where we already had several static analyzers in use for other non-
C++ projects. The DynaRoad build was configured in an existing job called
DynaRoad-trunk. This job is responsible for building, testing, and creating
installation archives of the DynaRoad development version. A new build
job DynaRoad-analyze was created that runs the newly created Check build
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target thus executing all static analyzers. This job was scheduled to run after
the main job as a dependency. As the dependency is only notified in case of
a successful build, the analysis is only done when needed.
The reports of each tool are gathered by a specialized Jenkins Analyzer
Collector2 plug-in capable of generating graphical trends and reports.
What made this plug-in even more useful for our integration was its feature
of reporting the warning differences between runs. This feature was further
configured to fail the build in case too many new warnings occurred. To help
developers notice these warnings, e-mail notifications are sent that also aid
them in fixing the warnings.
2https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/Analysis+Collector+Plugin
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Table 6.8: Most frequent warnings issued for DynaRoad version 5.3.0.
Name Warning Count
Clang Field X will be initialized after field Y . 57
Calling convention X ignore for this target. 36
Missing X prior to dependent type name. 16
Suggest braces around initialization of sub-object. 7
Private field X is not used. 6
Cppcheck Use const reference for X to avoid unnecessary data
copying.
19
Function parameterX should be passed by reference. 18
Unused variable. 9
Variable X is assigned a value that is never used. 8
BOOST_FOREACH caches the end iterator. It is unde-
fined behavior if you modify the container inside.
5
Cpplint Using deprecated casting style. 115
Single-argument constructors should be marked ex-
plicit.
26
Line ends in whitespace. 16
Redundant blank line at the end of a code block
should be deleted.
15
Failed to find complete declaration of class. 15
Flint The associated header file of .cpp files should be
included before any other includes.
214
volatile does not make your code thread-safe. 11
Heap-allocated exception: throw new X();. 11
boost::shared_ptr should be replaced by
boost::make_shared.
6
Implicit conversion to X may inadvertently be used. 6
PVS A code fragment from X cannot be analyzed. 527
Memsize type is used in the struct/class. 447
Decreased performance. Consider creating a point-
er/reference to avoid using the same expression re-
peatedly.
253
Be advised that the size of the type long varies
between LLP64/LP64 data models.
218
Dangerous magic number X used. 173
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we introduced the concept of static code analysis and focused
on its contribution to software quality. We began by explaining what the
benefits of static analysis are and how such analysis is limited by theoretical
and practical problems. Various practical use cases were expanded upon and
illustrated with examples.
We also examined the various methods and algorithms that static analyzers
are implemented with. Theoretical limits ensure that static analyzers can
never perfectly analyze all programs. They still provide useful benefits in
terms of defect finding due to their easy automation and use. The choice
of what methods to use depends on how deep of an understanding of the
code is desired. Static analysis tools can be used to find problems in source
code ranging from style issues to race conditions. Typical style checkers can
work very well with only a minimal understanding, thus only lexical pattern
matching is needed for the analysis.
We continued by divulging into the various problems facing static analysis
tools when analyzing C++ source code. These problems include aspects such
as: understanding complex and non-standard code, precision and scalability,
and how to manage false positives. To further our efforts in comprehending the
specifics of software defects, we introduced the notion of defect classifications,
which help us distinguish instances of defects. A few existing classifications are
detailed, in particular the security focused Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE). Since a major part of our thesis was to evaluate existing static analysis
tools, we researched several such tools and produced an feature summary of
them.
The DynaRoad software, being the target of our improvements, was
briefly introduced by giving an overview of its features and capabilities. A
technical overview of it then followed giving insight into the architectural
choices made during development. The build process and the existing static
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analysis tools used as part of it were furthermore detailed. Finally, as one of
the objectives of this thesis, we examined the possible improvements to the
aforementioned process.
We concluded the thesis by performing a comprehensive evaluation of four
open-source and two commercial tools. To find out what types of defects
the tools are capable of finding, we began by evaluating them using a set
of synthetic tests. Our set of tests included 30 different tests ranging from
buffer overflows to the use of floating point loop counters. None of the tools
were able to detect all defects, which clearly exemplifies the importance of
running many analyzers together. In practice, due to the varying detection
accuracies of these tools in different control-flow configurations, the tools are
able to complement each other quite well.
The best performer, Clang, positively detected defects in 15 out of all 30
tests. The next best accuracies were observed from Visual Studio 2013 and
Cppcheck. Both were able to detect 14 defects, but not all were the same
ones. We found it interesting that the best accuracy for a non-compiler tool
was by Cppcheck as it really shows that static analysis tools do not have to
be compiler-level language parsers. The only commercial non-compiler we
evaluated, PVS-Studio, came in close second detecting 11 different defects.
Cpplint and Flint, being mainly style checkers, were unsurprisingly the
worst performers with five detected defects each.
The second evaluation we performed was a differential analysis where the
defects detected by each tool were compared against the known crash defects
in our software. We retrieved the source code for six different point releases of
the stable version of our software. Each tool was then instructed to analyze
these versions individually. Then, the changes in the reports between each
version were compared against the information in our bug tracking software
which gave us a picture of their real-world accuracy. To our dismay, we found
that none of the tools were able to detect any of the known crash defects.
Granted, most of the crash bugs were not easy cases for static analyzers
to find. The tools did not possess the required capabilities to analyze deep
flow-related problems and domain-specific semantic behavior. Fortunately, it
was encouraging to see that many of the tools found other issues that had
been in the code for years.
As the final contribution of this thesis, we investigated the integration
of some of the evaluated tools into our own software engineering processes.
We used Jenkins as a continuous integrator that automatically built and
analyzed our software. This meant that we were receiving continuous and
automatic reports of the quality of our software. By integrating static analysis
tool with our existing automated dynamic tests, we found that both types of
testing complemented each other well. The main problem with introducing
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static analyzers to mature software was that the initial warning counts were
very large. Thus, the use of differential reports became relevant and aided
our adoption of these tools by notifying developers in case of new warnings.
This meant that we could ignore the original several thousand warnings at
least for a while.
7.1 Future Work
Our evaluation of Clang along with its static analyzer showed us that it
has excellent detection capabilities. What excites us even more is the great
potential of the framework and the future checkers1 being created with it.
Unfortunately, due to incompatibilities with our current code base, we were
unable to integrate it in our build process completely. It would be very
interesting to see how they would perform if the code was modified to make
Clang cleanly compile it.
As our objective was to put as many static analyzers into use as possible,
the idea of using commercial tools intrigues us. For us, the high price of
most commercial tools has been prohibitive, but it could be alleviated by
evaluating them in our environment beforehand. Having tools that can easily
be automated is the key, though, which is why the large graphical user
interfaces of these commercial tools have not interested us as much.
Another interesting prospect is the development and use of custom checkers.
Many project- and domain-specific issues can realistically only be found
through custom checks that have increased semantic knowledge of the code
base. One typical problem that we have noticed in DynaRoad is the omission
of certain functions calls required by our serialization library. Specifically, a
NotifyChange function must be called in every domain model class before
the model mutates itself [10]. Detecting the lack of this call and many similar
problems would be a perfect job for a static analyzer.
The way the static analyzers are currently automated in our build process
can also be improved. Our other projects, which are much younger than
DynaRoad, have been introduced with systematic code review. The code
review process integrates perfectly with automated static analysis and it can
use the analysis results to automatically down-vote defect introducing changes.
A similar process, which streamlines the work-flow and lessens the burden
on developers, has also been in use at Google [6] and is a possible future for
DynaRoad as well.
1http://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/potential_checkers.html
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Appendix A
Defect Descriptions
CWE-121: Stack-based buffer overflow
This defect specifically defines the case where a stack-allocated buffer
is overflown. What makes this case especially problematic is that an
attacker could execute arbitrary code by modifying function return
addresses and other similarly critical information.
CWE-122: Heap-based buffer overflow
When copying a buffer to another, the destination buffer should be large
enough to be able to contain the data of the source buffer. If this is not
the case, the destination buffer will overflow. In case the destination
buffer has been allocated on the heap, it is a heap-based buffer overflow.
CWE-134: Uncontrolled format string
Use of printf and other similar standard C functions support passing
a format string. A format string defines the way input or output is to
be handled and formatted, including types of values. In case the format
string can be directly manipulated by an attacker, the program can be
exploited to read and write unintended memory locations. Thus, it is
important that the format string is not provided by the user.
CWE-170: Improper null termination
In C and C++ strings are encoded with a terminating null character.
This allows strings lengths to be calculated by counting the number of
characters preceding the null character. In case the null character is
missing, these length calculations and other iterative character-based
operations will fail to correctly detect the end of the string. Such strings
can be the result of strncpy calls, which can end in a string without
null termination.
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CWE-190: Integer overflow
Integers can contain a finite range of values. Integers operations can
thus overflow when being added or multiplied together. Problems arise
when a program manages resources or execution using these possibly
overflown integers.
CWE-242: Use of inherently dangerous function
This vulnerability concerns the use of functions that are always dangers
no matter their use. One such function is the standard C function
gets. The purpose of this function is to return a string containing the
characters read from the user. Unfortunately, the caller can never be
sure how many characters were read, thus being unable to accommodate
and correctly allocate a buffer large enough. Any buffer is therefore
easily overflown by a malicious user.
CWE-327: Use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm
The standard C/C++ function rand is often implemented with a cryp-
tographically unsafe random number generator. Even if cryptographic
safety is not a requirement, better randomness is provided by other
standard or general purpose libraries. For C++ programs, the standard
library has implementations for many random number generators, such
as Mersenne Twister.
CWE-369: Divide by zero
Dividing integers with zero is undefined behavior and should thus be
prevented. Algorithms dividing integers by unknown values should
therefore check for zero divisors. This affects handling of user input as
well in case the user may directly invoke a division by zero. Floating
point numbers have a defined division-by-zero behavior.
CWE-401: Memory leak
Allocated memory should be deallocated after it is no longer needed,
but if it is not, the memory is leaked. If the program allocates a large
amount of memory repeatedly, leaking memory could lead to out-of-
memory errors. This can be used by attackers for denial of service
attacks.
CWE-413: Improper resource locking
Multi-threaded environments give rise to completely new problems for
programmers. One such typical issue is the lack of resource locking
when exclusive access to it is intended. For simple data types, locks can
be replaced with faster atomic operations.
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CWE-415: Double free
Memory freed with the free or delete-family of functions should not
be freed again. Freeing memory twice, i.e., double freeing, is undefined
behavior. In C++, use of smart pointers greatly decreases the prevalence
of these issues.
CWE-416: Use after free
In C and C++ a memory pointer is not set to null after it has been
freed. The existence of freed non-null pointer means that they can be
dereferenced after being freed. This leads to a use after free defect due
to the pointer still pointing to its former memory address.
CWE-457: Use of uninitialized variable
Variables in C and C++ can be left uninitialized. This can be seen
as a marginal performance optimization, but may lead to unintended
behavior if not correctly maintained. It is thus often safer to explicitly
initialize variables as that makes the code more maintainable due to
not relying on the variable being initialized on every execution path.
CWE-476: Null pointer dereference
Pointers in C and C++ can point to any conceivable memory address
only restricted by the address space. Typically, an invalid pointer will
point to the null address. Dereferencing a null pointer leads to undefined
behavior and is thus discouraged.
CWE-561: Dead code
Dead code is code that is never executed. This can mean that the code
contains a bug that leads to parts of the code never being executed.
Another typical reason is that the code is old and due to refactoring
is purposefully never executed. In any case, dead code should be
eliminated as that increases the maintainability and quality of the code
base.
CWE-590: Free of memory not on the heap
It is possible to use deallocation operations, like free and delete, on
memory addresses pointing to non-heap memory. Such calls lead to
undefined behavior and in many cases will crash the program. One
example of this is the deallocation of a pointer pointing to a variable
allocated on the stack.
CWE-663: Use of non-reentrant function in concurrent context
Some standard C library functions are non-reentrant, i.e., they are
not safe to use in multi-threaded environments. Typical examples of
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functions like these are strtok and rand. The reason for non-reentrancy
can often be attributed to global structures being manipulated by these
functions. To overcome these issues, compiler vendors can provide
non-portable reentrant versions of these functions.
CWE-676: Use of potentially dangerous function
This weakness describes the use of known problematic API functions,
such as strcpy. These functions can be used safely in some cases, but
incorrect use could lead to vulnerabilities. In the case of strcpy, the
problem manifests itself when the string to be copied is of undetermined
length, thus resulting in a possible buffer overflow.
CWE-762: Mismatched memory management routines
C++ introduces several new keywords related to memory management.
These are the new/delete and new[]/delete[] pairings of keywords.
The former allocates memory for a single C++ object calling its con-
structor at allocation and destructor at deallocation. The latter form
allocates memory for an array of C++ objects once again calling their
respective constructors and destructors. If these forms are mismatched
with each other or the C malloc/free functions, problems arise.
ARR32-CPP: Use of invalidated iterators
Iterators are basically pointers to elements in C++ containers. If the
container is modified it will in some cases invalidate all iterators. This
mostly happens when the container wants to reallocate its memory. Use
of invalidated iterators leads to undefined behavior.
DCL17-CPP: Pass large objects as const references
In addition to passing values by value or as pointers, C++ has support
for reference semantics. References are essentially non-null pointers and
provide a convenient way of passing around large objects. Passing by
const reference is typically faster than by passing by value as that avoids
the copying of the object. This is mostly a performance improvement.
ERR09-CPP: Throw temporaries and catch by reference
Exceptions can be allocated on the stack or on the heap. Unfortunately,
throwing exceptions allocated on the heap leaves responsibility of the
deallocation to the catcher. Stack-allocated exceptions on the other
hand can be thrown by value, thus creating a copy, or by taking the
address of it. Throwing while using the address-of operator essentially
throws a pointer. All this confusion can be solved by only throwing
anonymous temporaries and catching them as (const) references.
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ERR37-CPP: Use of deprecated function exception specification
Exception-specifications have been deprecated in the latest C++ standard
due to implementation and performance problems. The new standard
specifies the noexcept keyword that can be used to tell the compiler
and users of that function that no exceptions will be thrown from it. It
should be noted that the secure coding standard originally mandated
the correct use of the now deprecated throw() keyword.
EXP05-CPP: Do not use C-style casts
Variables and values in C can be cast to basically any other type. Due
to being backwards compatible with C, C++ maintains the same syntax
for type casts. It also introduces new keywords for the various new
casts in the language: static_cast, dynamic_cast, const_cast, and
reinterpret_cast. The use of these keywords is encouraged as they
are more explicit about the intention of the cast. They also have different
semantics to C-style casts.
EXP31-CPP: Avoid side effects in assertions
The C standard library macro assert can be used to make runtime
assertions about conditions in the program code. To only enable this
macro in debug builds, the macro is defined to be a no-op if NDEBUG is
defined. If assertions are made that modify the program state in any
way, the assertion is said to have side effects. This is a problem if the
program is ever built without defining NDEBUG as those side effects will
not exist. Thus, assertions should never have side effects.
EXP35-C: Do not modify objects with temporary lifetime
The typical instance of this is when a function returns the address to a
local variable declared inside the function. Dereferencing that address
and modifying the variable may lead to undefined behavior.
FLP30-CPP: Use of floating point variables as loop counters
Because floating point numbers are unable to represent all fractions
precisely, their use as loop counters is frowned upon. Loops with
such counters can result in infinite never-ending loops. As floating
point numbers are hardware-dependent, exact behavior of such loops is
difficult to predict.
INT11-CPP: Converting between pointers and integers
Care should be taken when casting integers to pointers and vice versa.
Mistakes are easy to make if wrong integer types are used or the integer
values are manipulated in some way. This leads to less portable code
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and should be avoided if possible. The C and C++ standard libraries
provide portable type definitions for pointer address values in case any
casting is required.
OOP32-CPP: Single-argument constructors should be “explicit”
Class constructors in C++ are by default implicit, i.e., they will be
used for implicit type conversions. The reason for this is backwards
compatibility with the C language. Often, these conversions are un-
intended and may lead to bugs that are difficult to find. Making all
single-argument constructors explicit, except when implicit conversions
are actually needed, makes the code more robust and less prone to bugs.
OOP34-CPP: Ensure proper destructor for polymorphic objects
Polymorphic objects can be deleted via pointers to their base class. For
such deletions to be well-defined, the base class is required to have a
virtual destructor.
Appendix B
DynaRoad Crash Defects
B.1 Version 5.3.0
Listing B.1: Integer division-by-zero error.
1 int days = get_work_days(start_date, finish_date, calendar);
2 double total_amount = 0;
3
4 if (total_amount > 0)
5 {
6 // days is zero
7 average_amount = total_amount / days;
8 }
Listing B.2: Unhandled exception due to erroneous format string in transla-
tion.
1 // format string missing variable placeholder
2 const string str = (format("String") % error_str).str();
Listing B.3: Null pointer dereference due to Windows system setting disabling
recent file history.
1 // file_list is null
2 if (index >= file_list−>size())
3 ...
B.2 Version 5.3.1
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Listing B.4: Use of floating point NaN as function argument due to division-
by-zero caused by user input.
1 // portion_begin equals portion_begin
2 return get_value(p−>get_location(), (portion − portion_begin) / (portion_end −
portion_begin));
Listing B.5: Unhandled exception due to logic error caused by user input.
1 const map_t::const_iterator i = m.find(p);
2
3 if (i == m.end())
4 {
5 // not handled
6 throw std::logic_error("not found");
7 }
Listing B.6: Use of freed memory due to logic error.
1 for (auto p : objects)
2 {
3 // p is already freed
4 if (!p−>get())
5 ...
6 }
B.3 Version 5.3.2
Listing B.7: Null pointer dereference due to invalid dynamic_cast in iterator
adaptor.
1 for (iterator i = task.begin(), i_end = task.end(); i != i_end; ++i)
2 {
3 const task_t& t = ∗∗i;
4 // t is a dereferenced null pointer
5 const location_t& l = t.get_location();
6 ...
7 }
Listing B.8: Thread using freed memory due to missing thread termination.
1 void static_thread_function(void∗ param)
2 {
3 dialog_t& dlg = ∗reinterpret_cast<dialog_t∗>(param);
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4 ...
5 dlg.thread−>solve();
6 ...
7 dlg.thread−>stop(); // dlg has been destructed during the call to solve
8 return 0;
9 }
Listing B.9: Use of invalid array index.
1 // get_array returns wrapper to empty array
2 if (e.get_array().get_at(0).get_number() > 0)
3 ...
Listing B.10: Out-of-range vector insertion position due to invalid negative
parameter.
1 // row is −1
2 void model::insert_row(const int row, const int count)
3 {
4 if (count == 0)
5 return;
6 ...
7 const int index = calculate_index(∗this, row, 0);
8 items_.insert(items_.begin() + index, count ∗ columns_, 0);
9 ...
10 }
B.4 Version 5.3.3
Listing B.11: Use of a reference bound to a temporary auto_ptr.
1 // convert returns a temporary auto_ptr
2 const bitmap_t& converted = (bitmap.get_format() == FORMAT_XYZ) ?
bitmap : ∗bitmap.convert(FORMAT_XYZ);
3 return std::auto_ptr<Bitmap>(new Bitmap(BitmapInfo(converted.get_width(),
converted.get_height(), converted.is_alpha(), converted.get_bpp(), converted.
get_data())));
B.5 Version 5.3.4
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Listing B.12: Null dereference of wrapped pointer retrieved from an external
library.
1 // get_object returns an object wrapping a null pointer
2 object_t o = element.get_object();
3
4 if (o.get_type() == type_xyz)
5 ...
B.6 Version 5.3.5
Listing B.13: vector insertion throws unhandled exception due to an out-of-
memory error.
1 // not enough memory for vector insertion
2 items_.insert(items_.begin() + index, count ∗ columns_, 0);
Listing B.14: Null pointer dereference due to missing handling of deleted
pointers.
1 // get_source returns a dereferenced freed pointer
2 set.insert(&u.get_source().get_site());
Listing B.15: Unhandled std::bad_alloc exception due to excessive copying.
1 bitmap_t::bitmap_t(const int width, const int height, const int bytes_per_line,
const format_t fmt)
2 {
3 // not enough memory for vector resize operation
4 data_.resize(bytes_per_line ∗ height);
5 }
Listing B.16: Passing null pointers to std::string::assign.
1 if (loaded && p)
2 {
3 // UserName is null
4 user_name.assign(p−>UserName);
5 // CredentialBlob is null
6 const wchar_t∗ const q = reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t∗>(p−>
CredentialBlob);
7 password.assign(q, q + p−>CredentialBlobSize / sizeof(wchar_t));
8 }
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Listing B.17: Unhandled exception due to logic error.
1 // unhandled exception
2 throw std::logic_error("not started"));
Listing B.18: Unhandled exception due to logic error.
1 // unhandled exception
2 throw calendar_exception();
